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Power systems will increasingly rely on synchrophasor systems for reliable and 
high-performance wide area monitoring and control (WAMC). Synchrophasor systems 
greatly use information communication technologies (ICT) for data exchange which are 
vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Prior to installation of a synchrophasor system a set of cyber 
security requirements must be developed and new devices must undergo vulnerability 
testing to ensure that proper security controls are in place to protect the synchrophasor 
system from unauthorized access. This dissertation describes vulnerability analysis and 
testing performed on synchrophasor system components. Two network fuzzing 
frameworks are proposed; for the IEEE C37.118 protocol and for an energy management 
system (EMS).  
While fixing the identified vulnerabilities in information infrastructures is 
imperative to secure a power system, it is likely that successful intrusions will still occur. 
The ability to detect intrusions is necessary to mitigate the negative effects from a 
successful attacks. The emergence of synchrophasor systems provides real-time data with 
millisecond precision which makes the observation of a sequence of fast events feasible. 
 
 
Different power system scenarios present different patterns in the observed fast event 
sequences. This dissertation proposes a data mining approach called mining common 
paths to accurately extract patterns for power system scenarios including disturbances, 
control and protection actions and cyber-attacks from synchrophasor data and logs of 
system components. In this dissertation, such a pattern is called a common path, which is 
represented as a sequence of critical system states in temporal order. The process of 
automatically discovering common paths and building a state machine for detecting 
power system scenarios and attacks is introduced. The classification results show that the 
proposed approach can accurately detect these scenarios even with variation in fault 
locations and load conditions. 
This dissertation also describes a hybrid intrusion detection framework that 
employs the mining common path algorithm to enable a systematic and automatic IDS 
construction process. An IDS prototype was validated on a 2-line 3-bus power 
transmission system protected by the distance protection scheme. The result shows the 
IDS prototype accurately classifies 25 power system scenarios including disturbances, 
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The need of electric market regulation and the connection of neighboring electric 
grids motivate the use of wide area monitoring systems from which utilities have 
improved visibility of the power grid. Many utilities in the United States of America 
(USA) received grants from the Department of Energy (DOE) under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to create wide area monitoring systems. Wide 
area monitoring systems are measurement systems that use information communication 
technology (ICT) to transmit digital and/or analogue data measured by field sensors. The 
wide area monitoring systems use synchrophasor technology to improve the visualization 
and situational awareness through high quality measurements of voltage, current, and 
frequency. The synchrophasor systems require installation of phasor measurement units 
(PMU), and substation phasor data concentrators (PDC), among other devices and 
software. PMUs and substation PDCs are networked appliances which use routable 
network protocols to communicate. They are the key components in the synchrophasor 
system and may become the target of cybersecurity attacks against bulk electric power 
systems. Threats against these devices include denial of service attacks, attacks against 
open ports and services intended to elevate privilege, attempts to change device settings, 
attempts to inject malicious device commands, attempts to hijack device access 
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credentials or other confidential information, and attempts to place a man-in-the-middle 
between devices.  
Due to the critical role that the electric power systems play in our society, there is 
a common agreement among different organizations that the electric power grid needs to 
be better secured to ensure continuous power being provided to the nation [1]. The 
ARRA grants required recipient entities to develop a cybersecurity plan which includes a 
risk assessment as part of parent wide area monitoring systems projects. Also, the 
synchrophasor devices, i.e. PMUs and PDCs, may be declared North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard 002-3 
[2] critical cyber assets (CCA), depending upon each individual unit’s application within 
the electric power system. CCA must be housed within an electronic security perimeter 
and undergo a cyber-vulnerability assessment. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 also documents the guidelines and 
requirements for industry to better secure their facilities [3].  
While there is significant research in the vulnerability assessment of cybersecurity 
for traditional Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, there are 
comparatively few publicly known vulnerabilities for synchrophasor-based monitoring 
and control systems. In addition, the tight integration of information communication 
technology and the physical process poses new challenges to the synchrophasor-based 
electric power system. For example, it has been shown that data delay and loss from a 
communication system can cause serious interruption in control application of the electric 
power system [15]. The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 
realized that current security guidelines from different organizations are not sufficient to 
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securely implement the future electricity grid that employs synchrophasor technology and 
it calls for research and development to improve current security mechanisms [4].  
1.2 Cyber-physical environment of power system 
A typical power system is divided into four functional parts: generation, 
transmission, distribution, and consumers. The electric transmission system is the 
backbone of the power system transmitting the electric power from generators to the load 
centers over a long distance. The structure of a cyber-physical environment for the electric 
transmission system augmented with synchrophasor technology is shown in Figure 1.1. 
The transmission system devices are mainly composed of transmission lines, breakers, and 
transformers that are monitored by field sensors. In the case of a synchrophasor system 
these field sensors are PMUs. The PMUs attached to transmission lines provide 
synchronized data that is time-stamped using Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) for 
continuous real-time monitoring. Phasor Data Concentrators (PDCs) collect synchrophasor 
measurements from PMUs that are located in different locations and send the 
measurements to the control center through the wide-area network (WAN). PMUs in 
different locations and PDCs are key components in the synchrophasor based wide area 
monitoring system (WAMS). Compared to the traditional SCADA system where the field 
sensors measure the system once per several seconds, the emergence of WAMS leveraging 
synchrophasor technology allows much faster measuring for the transmission system at the 
rates ranging from 30 samples per second to 120 samples per second [8]. Nowadays, 
synchrophasor measurements are not the only time-synchronized data in a system shown 
in Figure 1.1.  As more devices and power system components such as relays, breakers etc. 
are integrated with the capability to synchronize to UTC, the status and measurements from 
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these devices are also time stamped and can be sent back to control center in real time [11].  
The redundant information contributed by the time-synchronized data provides benefits for 
reliability, efficiency, and economics in power system monitoring and control. The extreme 
low latency offered by time-synchronized data allows various real-time wide area control 
algorithms and special protection schemes to be used to increase power grid reliability and 
stability [9][11][12][13][14]. The information flow described above is shown as the dotted 
line in Figure 1.1 and is often recognized as a control loop. In the case of a distributed 
control, the protection components in the system sense the disturbance and react to it by 
themselves. The bi-directed-arrow lines in between control components and WAN 
indicates not only the command data sent from control center but also the time-
synchronized audit information reported from intelligent electronic devices (IDEs) to the 
control center.  
 













The system can be considered as a finite state machine. If, for example, a tripping 
operation is sent from control center, this will cause system state transitions because a 
signal-sending operation has been recorded in the control panel which is one component 
of the system. In general, the changes of the behaviors in different system components such 
as a breaker, relay, and transmission lines in a given period of time or at a definite point of 
time will cause the system state to transition from one state to another. These changes are 
reflected by the transmission line sensor readings or device logs. If the system state is 
represented as a set of observations (from logs of different components) and measurement 
data (from measurement devices) inside the system, such changes along with time can be 
regarded as temporal state transitions. 
1.3 Cybersecurity challenges in synchrophasor-based power system 
The electric power system in the past was often isolated and used proprietary 
devices and software. However, the synchrophasor system greatly relies on the 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components e.g. hardware (e.g. Personal Computers 
(PCs), network appliances, database servers), Windows Operating System, and 
standardized IP-based industrial protocols such as IEC 61850 and IEEE C37.118. The 
commercial hardware and software are usually the popular targets of cyber-attacks. There 
are a large number of exploits available in an exploit frameworks such as Metaspoit [64]. 
It is proved that power systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks [80]. Most industrial 
protocols use open standards without security features. In addition, there are still a large 
number of legacy devices in the field that do not have security control mechanisms at all. 
As such, the power system may be subjected to cyber-attacks. Potential catastrophic 
consequences have been learned from Aurora [65] and Stuxnet [7] attacks where 
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attackers penetrated the network, gained access to the control software and altered system 
states to destabilize the control systems. As a key componet in a cyber-physcial power 
system, research should be conducted to determine the the adequency of cybersecurity 
efforts in synchrophasor system.  
Developing robust cyber infrastructure requires intrusion prevention. Intrusion 
prevention techniques developed from penetration testing can fix the security breaches 
and effectively prevent known attacks. However, failures in intrusion prevention are still 
likely to occur, which can result in a compromise in the cyber infrastructure. A failure in 
intrusion prevention may be exploited by, for example, a zero-day attack that is unknown 
to the intrusion prevention mechenism. While successful attacks are always possible, 
intrusion detection as a means for defense in depth is necessary to be deployed to detect 
them. Intrusion detection system is helpful in reducing the negative impact in that fast 
responses to stop the attack can be taken as soon as the attack is identified. Traditional 
signature-based intrusion detection systems e.g. Snort are helpful to detect malicious 
activities when a malicious network packet is found. However, due to the increasing 
interaction between cyber infrastructure and the physical infrastructure created by the 
emergence of high-speed networks in electric power system attacks against future power 
systems will not be limited to those of the traditional IT system. Therefore traditional 
intrusion detection systems may not be enough to protect the future power grid from 
cyber-attacks that aim to interrupt physical processes. An example of such attacks is 
resonance attacks in which an attacker who has compromised system sensors or 
controllers causes the physical system to oscillate at its resonant frequency [5]. Another 
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example is demonstrated in [6] where an attack can inject false data to compromise 
meters to bypass the existing bad data detection algorithms.  
1.4 Objectives 
Over 1,000 PMU have been installed across North America, and many local and 
regional phasor data concentrators collect real-time, high-speed, time-synchronized 
information about power grid conditions to enhance grid operations and protect grid 
reliability. This information is also shared between transmission and power plant owners 
and grid operators to improve wide-area visualization of power grid states across large 
regions and to enhance situational awareness. Such information also enables advanced 
monitoring and control algorithms and new types of intrusion detection system that 
leverage the system state information to detect malicious system behaviors. 
Despite the benefits that synchrophasor systems bring to the power grid, they 
exist threats of cyber-attacks as synchrophasor devices are highly interconnected using 
information and communications technology (ICT). Synchrophasor devices are becoming 
more attractive to attackers. First they usually directly interact with the physical power 
system as they are installed in substations and measure transmission line parameters 
including current, voltage, and frequency. Synchrophasor device unavailability will cause 
the grid operators and plant owners to lose the view of power system conditions. Second, 
as more synchrophasor devices are integrated with protection relays, compromise of these 
devices may also result in attackers controlling breakers, which can lead to blackouts.  
One objective of this work is to develop a methodology to identify vulnerabilities 
associated with synchrophasor devices. This methodology will also identify gaps between 
available security features of synchrophasor devices and the cyber security standards or 
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requirements.  This work demonstrates that a testing process and tools can be developed 
to conduct the vulnerability assessment for synchrophasor devices and protocols. One 
significant problem related to vulnerability testing for synchrophasor devices is the lack 
of protocol fuzzing tools available for mutating the IEEE C37.118 protocol.  Also, 
current commercial protocol mutation tools are limited to mutating server to client 
commands and cannot mutate server to client responses. This makes commercial tools 
unsuitable to test the IEEE C37.118 protocol. This work demonstrates a network fuzzing 
framework developed to mutate IEEE C37.118 protocol packets and useful protocol 
mutation of other protocols used by synchrophasor devices. 
While identifying and closing synchrophasor system cyber vulnerabilities is 
imperative, successful intrusions can still occur. Time-stamped data synchrophasor 
measurements and device log provide cyber security researchers a new way to enable 
intrusion detection. This leads to a research problem of developing unique signatures for 
power system scenarios (i.e. disturbances) and cyber-attacks from the large amounts of 
data available in a synchrophasor system. Due to power system and measurement system 
dynamics, events present in the data have timestamp variation which makes mining 
patterns difficult. A number of publications (See Chapter II) discuss using machine 
learning methods to learn patterns for power system disturbances or cyber attacks but 
none of the methods described in literature can be applied to mine patterns of both types. 
Traditional data mining algorithms are designed to work on a small amount of data and 
cannot easily be used to classify specific power system scenarios and cyber attacks [28]. 
Therefore, in this dissertation we describe a new data mining method called mining 
common paths which learns unique signatures for different power system scenarios and 
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cyber attacks in terms of common paths from massive heterogeneous data collected from 
a power system. We prove the correctness and usability of common paths by creating 
patterns and classifying different power system disturbances and cyber attacks on one 
transmission line. 
Various research has been conducted to create intrusion detection systems (IDS) 
for smart grid, however, proposed methods suffer from different shortcomings. For 
example, host-based IDS is only able to monitor one location of the system. Network-
based IDS only focuses on network activities. Rule and specification-based IDS suffer 
from limited scalability due to labor-intensive IDS creation and update procedures. One 
objective of this dissertation is to create a new type of IDS that overcomes able to 
monitor a fusion of data from heterogeneous power system sensors to classify actions or 
scenarios which have recently occurred. The mining common paths algorithm was 
applied to train an intrusion detection system for a power system of 3 buses and 2 
transmission lines. The IDS was capable of classifying 25 separate disturbance, control, 
and cyber-attack scenarios. This work proves that an IDS trained using the mining 
common paths algorithm can monitor a power system implementing the distance 
protection scheme. This work also shows that the mining common paths algorithm can 
automatically learn patterns for a variety of cyber attacks, power system disturbances and 
valid control actions from huge amount of data with little human interaction. Finally, this 
work demonstrates the intrusion detection system is able to accurately classify each 





This dissertation makes three primary contributions to industry and academia. 
First, this dissertation presents a vulnerability testing process for PMU, PDC, and energy 
management systems (EMS) which was successfully used to identify vulnerabilities in a 
commercial synchrophasor system. The vulnerability testing includes a new fuzzing 
framework for the IEEE C37.118 protocol and the EMS. The testing process has been 
performed on PMU, PDC, and EMS from a major commercial hardware provider and a 
major power system software provider. Various vulnerabilities have been identified and 
reported to utilities and vendors. Suggestions on how to mitigate the security risk and to 
improve the security features of synchrophasor devices were also provided based on 
discovered vulnerabilities. 
Second, this dissertation documents a data mining approach called mining 
common path algorithm which accurately mines patterns from power system scenarios 
including disturbances, valid control actions, and cyber-attacks from synchrophasor data 
and logs of system components. These patterns, also known as common paths, represent 
system behaviors unique to each scenario and can be used to classify each scenario. The 
data mining algorithm is based on the mining sequential patterns algorithm which was 
found in the human health diagnosis research domain to learn patient’s physiological 
states. One contribution of this work is that we applied this data mining method to mine 
patterns for power system scenarios and cyber attacks. However, this algorithm requires 
that massive data to be preprocessed into a specific form called paths. To overcome this 
obstacle, another contribution of this work was development of a method to preprocess 
synchrophasor and power system state data into a set of paths usable by the algorithm. 
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Paths retain all events which have occurred in the system in a compressed form. As such 
the data can be processed by the mining common paths algorithm.  Compared to other 
traditional data mining algorithms in [28], the classifier trained using mining common 
paths algorithm is able to provide more precise classification which enables automated 
controllers such as autonomic control frameworks in [66].  
 Finally, this dissertation also developed a hybrid intrusion detection system,  
trained using the mining common paths algorithm, to detect a variety of power system 
scenarios and cyber attacks in a large power system. The capability of the resulting IDS 
to classify the specific power scenarios and cyber attacks advances IDS state-of-art . The 
resulting IDS also complements current IDS techniques for Smart Grid by satisfying the 
following requirements. 
Requirement 1, the IDS should perform stateful monitoring at the system level. 
This means the IDS should be able to provide monitoring at different locations of the 
system to be able to monitor ordered sequences of execution events. Requirement 2, the 
IDS must be able to monitor actions of an automated control algorithm. It should be able 
to distinguish actions which originate from a system operator or automated control 
algorithm from similar actions which originate from an attacker where the primary 
distinguishing feature is the state of the system when the action occurs. Namely, we 
expect the new IDS to be able to detect not only cyber-attacks, but also power system 
disturbances and normal operations. For this work, the IDS must be able to monitor a 
system implementing the distance protection scheme for normal and attack behaviors. 
Requirement 3, the IDS must be able to detect zero day attacks, i.e. attacks that are 
unknown to the IDS. Requirement 4, the IDS should be able to process high volumes of 
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data from multiple sensors. Requirement 5, the IDS must be low cost. Cost includes 
development time and compute resources required to implement the IDS. This 
requirement also includes that the IDS should be able to extend to new scenarios as they 
are detected. Requirement 6, the IDS must be scalable to larger and more complex control 
algorithms.  This requirement is intended to address the dynamic nature of the power 
system. The IDS must be able to continue to correctly classify behaviors as system 
configuration and load change. The IDS must be able to detect events that occur in 






2.1 Current research in power system vulnerability assessment  
The National SCADA Test Bed Program run by the Idaho National Lab (INL) 
built a large scale SCADA test bed for the purpose of assessing control system 
cybersecurity, improving and extending the cybersecurity standards as well as training. 
Various common vulnerabilities associated with SCADA systems are reported in [9] 
from the program. Findings and learned lessons are summarized in [16] from security 
assessment of control systems. The program also develops recommended procurement 
language to enhance and improve the security in wireless systems for advanced metering 
infrastructure [17]. In addition, INL is engaged in cyber security standard improvement, 
training and cyber security assessment of software and hardware products for power 
system industry. However, no result is reported from INL regarding to cyber security 
assessment for synchrophasor system. 
Researchers have performed vulnerability assessments of generation and 
substation devices to support development of taxonomies of vulnerabilities related to 
industrial control systems. In [18] Fovino et al. describe a test bed used for vulnerability 
assessment of components found in a Turbo-Gas Power Plant.  
In [19] Skaggs et al. describe a tool, NETGLEAN, testing device for network 
vulnerabilities.  Two well-known tools are available for network vulnerability testing of 
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industrial control systems.  Wurldtech [20] offers the Achilles Satellite product for testing 
industrial control system devices.  MU Dynamics [21] offers the MU Test Suite for 
testing networked devices, include industrial control system devices.  Both products 
include protocol mutation and denial of service test suites. 
2.2 Current research in data mining techniques in application to event detection 
for power system 
Compared to peer works, this work is unique in that we propose a data mining 
algorithm that can learn patterns for both power system disturbances and cyber-attacks 
from heterogeneous data including synchrophasor measurements and device logs from 
multiple locations in the power system. Multiple traditional data mining algorithms were 
used to classify power system faults and cyber-attacks in [28]. The traditional data 
mining algorithms were able to differentiate between three broad categories with 
approximately 70% accuracy, power system disturbance, control action, and cyber-attack, 
however, the traditional data mining algorithms were not able to classify specific fault 
and cyber-attack types within each large category. 
Current research on applying data mining to synchrophasor data for power system 
fault and disturbance classification can be found in [68] and [69]. These works limit 
algorithm input to synchrophasor measurements and do not provide cyber-attack 
detection. The K-nearest neighbor algorithm was used to classify three phase faults 
(3LG), voltage oscillation, and voltage sag scenarios in [68]. The algorithm accuracy is 
not provided in [68].  Stream data mining is used in [69]. This approach was able to 
classify 3LG and single line to ground (1LG) faults grouped for binary classification with 
greater than 90% accuracy.  Both [68] and [69] used simulated power system data. 
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Many other data mining approaches have been developed to extract signatures 
and classify power system disturbances but they have no ability to detect cyber-attacks. 
Many such approaches classify power system disturbances in the time domain. Decision 
trees were used to classify power system disturbances in [22] and [23].  Statistical 
characteristics of power system frequency were used in [24] to represent the signatures of 
power system disturbances. Frequency domain analysis has been proposed to avoid 
complex transient phenomena in time-domain waveforms. The frequency domain 
approaches first convert time-domain waveforms to the frequency domain using wavelet 
or/and Fourier transforms and then extract oscillation related features.  Both Support 
Vector Machines (SVM) [25] and artificial neural networks (ANN) [26] have been used 
to classify of disturbances in the frequency domain. Many works have applied neural 
networks to classify faults. Using current and voltage data as input, patterns for faults can 
be learned by radial basis function neural networks [72], Kohonen neural networks [74] 
and self-organizing map-based neural networks [73]. In [75] the authors used a neural 
network with current waveforms and data from digital fault recorders to classify faults, 
normal maintenance operations, and power-quality disturbances. The work presented in 
this work uses a sequential data mining approach to classify patterns from sequences of 
events. Sequential data mining is better suited for high velocity and high volume 
synchrophasor data streams because synchrophasor data is discrete data but continuous in 
time. Additionally, the mining common paths algorithm presented in this work can learn 
to classify traditional power system contingencies, such as faults, and cyber-attacks 




Machine learning approaches have also been applied to detect cyber-attacks 
against power systems. In [27], detection rules were derived by manually specifying 
allowable ranges for different system measurements using domain expert knowledge. 
Such specification based methods have been shown to have high detection accuracy; 
however, the manual effort required to develop such a decision tree is too great to apply 
to a problem on the scale of power system protection. Traditional machine learning 
algorithms were applied to a dataset which captured power system disturbances, control 
actions, and cyber-attacks [28]. The machine learning algorithms were able to 
successfully differentiate between grouped power system disturbances, control actions, 
and cyber-attacks, but, were not able to classify specific events in each larger category. 
Additionally, the machine learning algorithms make a classification decision for each row 
of the data set, which, was sampled at a rate of 120 measurements per second.    
Providing a classification at each row of the dataset rate amplifies the total number of 
false positives.  The IDS presented in this dissertation provides a classification at once 
per detected scenario which results in one classification per several thousand rows of the 
dataset minimizing the volume of false positives. 
Other works have been found which provide intrusion detection for 
synchrophasor systems. An IDS was proposed which uses white lists to detect invalid 
network behaviors based on a synchrophasor network protocol specification [29]. A 
second proposed IDS uses timing and data volume information to identify data integrity 
attacks against synchrophasor systems [30]. To the best of authors’ knowledge no 
research has been published which detects both power system disturbances and cyber-
attacks at the same time.  
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The data mining technique used in this dissertation uses “mining sequential 
patterns” technique which discovers patterns of activity sequences from time ordered 
data. The “mining sequential patterns” algorithm was first mentioned in [31]. It was used 
to discover patterns in clinical client care management process data that consists of 
patient records and log data over a period of treatment time [32]. This technique was 
extended in [33] by employing a two dimension Bayesian network to graphically 
represent patterns in Hemodialysis processes which consist of a sequence of medical 
activities over time. In order to discover patterns, a patients’ physiological “state” is 
defined using clinical log data and patient records (e.g. body temperature). The pattern is 
therefore, represented as contiguous transitions of states in a two dimension graph. The 
classification was made using the patterns.  
For this work, the FP-growth algorithm is used to mine frequent sequential 
patterns. FP-Growth reduces the cost of searching for frequent sequences by adopting a 
divide-and-conquer strategy [34]. As demonstrated in [70], FP-graph algorithm 
outperforms several popular frequent pattern mining algorithms in run time and therefore 
it was chosen for this work. 
2.3 Current research in intrusion detection system for smart grid 
2.3.1 Intrusion detection system (IDS) for smart grid 
In recent years, the emergence of the smart grid has motivated research into a 
variety of IDS techniques. People with different backgrounds have created various IDS 
that focus on different aspects of the smart grid. One type of IDS research focuses on 
intelligent electronic device (IED) security within the smart grid. For example, Chee-
Wooi Ten et al. developed an anomaly-based detection technique to detect attacks against 
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IED [35]. The Chee-Wooi Ten IDS is host-based thus only identifies attacks against a 
single IED in the substation using sequential events recorded in the log from that IED. 
Another IDS proposed by Chen et al. provides a protection mechanism for smart 
household appliances [36]. Chen et al. created security rules for individual appliances by 
proposing homogeneous functions that models three factors of the appliance: device 
security, usability and electricity pricing. While these two IDS secure individual devices 
in the smart grid, they do not provide stateful monitoring at system level for the smart 
grid. More advanced IDS of this type consider behaviors of multiple devices within the 
system to obtain system level detection. In [27], Mitchell et al. propose a rule-based IDS 
for the electric grid by considering the behaviors of three types of physical devices in the 
electric grid: head-ends, distribution access points/data aggregation points, and subscriber 
energy meters. Mitchell et al. use readings from 22 sensors from the three types of 
devices as state components. By quantizing each of the 22 components into a limited 
number of ranges, they manually build three state machines with 3456, 1728, and 3456 
states for the three devices respectively in terms of conjunctive normal form. To 
manually build such an IDS is very expensive due to the large state space. Additionally, 
this IDS uses a limited number of sensors therefore is able to detect a limited number of 
attacks. Since there are always new attacks and applications, this method is not scalable. 
Network based IDS leverage communication traffic in the information 
infrastructure of smart grid to detect cyber-attacks. Yang et al. propose an IDS for 
synchrophasor systems that detects cyber-attacks by using access control white lists, 
protocol-based white lists and network behavior-based rules, each of which specify 
security rules in different layers of the synchrophasor system [29]. The Yang et al. IDS is 
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limited to cyber-attacks including MITM and DoS against synchrophasor devices and 
IEEE C37.118 protocol. Similar to Yang’s IDS, Zhang et al. propose a distributed IDS 
that analyzes communications traffic at different network levels of smart grid including 
home area networks, neighborhood area networks, and wide area networks [37]. An 
intelligent module is deployed at each level to classify malicious data and possible cyber-
attacks using data mining algorithms. These modules then communicate to get a system 
level view of the status of the whole communication network to improve the detection 
accuracy. Hadeli et al., in [38], propose an anomaly detection technique for industrial 
control systems that extracts behavior patterns of devices from protocols used in 
industrial control systems, for example, GOOSE messages, IEEE 61850, Manufacturing 
Message Specification, Modbus/TCP and redundant network routing protocols. The 
Hadeli IDS uses a system description file to provide a full description of the overall 
communication pattern in the industrial control system. For the case of power system 
control applications, the system description file describes expected system behaviors 
from information carried by those protocols. Hadeli’s method, along with [29] and [37] 
are efficient to detect malicious activities that cause changes in network traffic, but the 
IDS fails to detect malicious actions that result in invalid changes to the physical system. 
For example, Hadeli’s method cannot detect a malicious command to trip a protection 
relay from a valid IP address which will take a transmission line out of service and cause 
a blackout. A specification-based IDS that can track sequential events of the system is 
reported in [39] for the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). The authors manually 
built a state machine by extracting specifications from two AMI protocols and devices 
status. To prove the correctness of the state machine, a model checking technique was 
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used to verify the specifications. This IDS is also not applicable to transmission systems 
because transmission systems have far more control actions and disturbances than AMI. 
As such, manually building a state machine would be very expensive.  
Other proposed IDS for smart grid leverage power system theory. For instance, in 
[40], Valenzuela et al. use optimal power flow programs to detect cyber-attacks which 
alter system measurement data as the bad data will cause the power flow to be dispatched 
erroneously. Talebi et al. propose a mechanism for identification of bad data attacks in a 
power system using weighted state estimation [41]. Zonouz et al. proposed an IDS that 
not only examines the measurement data using state estimation and power flow theory 
but also includes the results from network IDS to calculate the probability that the data is 
compromised [42]. Although these works are all proven capable of detecting altered data, 
these IDS are limited to one type of attack and cannot be extended to detect other attacks 
against power systems. 
2.3.2 Accuracy of specification-based IDS 
The detection accuracy of specification-based IDS depends on how accurately the 
specifications describe system behaviors. Different efforts have been made to build 
accurate specifications for specification-based IDS. One approach is to use a formal 
language, such as the declarative language MuSigs [44] to describe known attacks using 
temporal logic formulas [45]. The MuSigs authors formally specified attack signatures 
and proved the soundness and completeness of their detection rules. The use of a formal 
language to specify behaviors is too work intensive for a power system IDS where there 
are too many behaviors to specify. 
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 A promising way to improve the accuracy of specifications is through the use of 
data mining. A data mining technique was applied to an IDS framework proposed by Lee 
et al. that combined signature-based IDS and anomaly-based IDS [43]. Data mining 
programs were applied to a large volume of log data to learn attack signatures and normal 
behavior patterns and automatically create detection rules. Lee et al. showed that the 
signatures for attacks and patterns for system normal behaviors created using their data 
mining technique are accurate by comparing their results for probing and user to root 
privilege escalation attacks to all other participants in the DARPA intrusion detection 
evaluation program prepared by MIT Lincoln Labs. The overall detection accuracy of 
their IDS against 4 types of attacks is 80.2% and is the highest among all participants. 
Lee’s IDS was originally designed for stateless IDS therefore it cannot be directly applied 
to specification-based IDS. A new data mining algorithm must be developed to discover 
sequential events for specifications. 
2.3.3 Data mining techniques for learning specifications  
A specification for a scenario contains a sequence of execution events or system 
states. The nature of specifications requires the data mining technique applied to the 
proposed IDS to be able to mine sequential patterns and identify the dependent 
relationship between events. The data mining technique used in this dissertation uses the 
“mining sequential patterns” technique which discovers patterns of activity from time 
ordered data. The “mining sequential patterns” algorithm was first mentioned in [31]. Lin 
et al. applied it to discover patterns in clinical client care management process data that 
consists of patient records and log data over a period of treatment time [32]. This 
technique was extended in [33] by employing a two dimension Bayesian network to 
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graphically represent patterns in Hemodialysis processes which consist of a sequence of 
medical activities over time. In order to discover patterns, a patients’ physiological 
“state” is defined using clinical log data and patient records (e.g. body temperature). The 
pattern is therefore, represented as contiguous transitions of states in a 2-dimention graph. 




CYBERSECURITY TESTING FOR SYNCHROPHASOR SYSTEM 
3.1 Introduction 
Many utilities in the United States of America received grants from the 
Department of Energy under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to 
create wide area monitoring systems. The ARRA grants require recipient entities to 
develop a cybersecurity plan which includes a risk assessment as part of parent wide area 
monitoring systems projects. Wide area monitoring systems require installation of phasor 
measurement units (PMU), and substation phasor data concentrators (PDC), among other 
devices and software.  PMUs and substation PDCs are networked appliances which use 
routable protocols.  As such, these devices may be declared North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standard 002-3 
[2] critical cyber assets (CCA), depending upon each individual unit’s application within 
the power system.  CCA must be housed within an electronic security perimeter and 
undergo a cyber vulnerability assessment.   
The IEEE 1402 Guide for Electric Power Substation Physical and Electronic 
Security [2] defines cyber intrusion or electronic intrusion as “Entry into the substation 
via telephone lines or other electronic-based media for the manipulation or disturbance of 
electronic devices.”  PMU and substation PDC are networked appliances and may 
become the target of attacks against bulk electric power systems. Threats against these 
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devices include denial of service attacks, attacks against open ports and services intended 
to elevate privilege, attempts to change device settings, attempts to inject malicious 
device commands, attempts to hijack device access credentials or other confidential 
information, and attempts to place a man-in-the-middle between devices. 
This chapter describes the process used to develop a set of cyber security 
requirements for PMU and PDC installation. Three primary sources were used to derive 
cyber security requirements. First, NISTIR 7628: Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber 
Security [3] was reviewed and 28 relevant requirements were taken from this document. 
Second, the Department of Homeland Security: Cyber Security Procurement Language 
for Control Systems was reviewed. This document was used to derive project 
requirements and used as a basis for procurement language added to vendor contracts. 
Second, this dissertation describes testing performed to identify PMU and PDC 
vulnerabilities prior to device installation in a production control system.   A MU 
Dynamics MU-4000 Analyzer was used to perform network congestion testing, denial of 
service testing, and protocol mutation testing.  Testing also included device manual 
reviews to identify security related features, security feature testing, network traffic 
disclosure testing, and subjecting of devices to network isolation via introduction of 
extraneous VLAN, and a man-in-the-middle attack.  Results from the tests were provided 
to the utility to enable network monitoring to mitigate identified vulnerabilities and to 
allow the utility to work device vendors to create corrective action plans.   PMUs and 
PDCs from multiple vendors were tested.   Vendor names and product identifiers are 
withheld from this article to prevent enabling attacks.  Results from this testing have been 
shared with device vendors.  Finally, this dissertation describes a methodology for 
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developing signature based intrusion detection system developed for us in bulk electric 
substations. The intrusion detection system described take information from multiple 
sources including, SNORT, synchrophasor data, relay data logs, and energy management 
system logs to provide model based classification of system occurrences as valid faults or 
network based attacks.  
The body of this chapter includes a section describing synchrophasor system 
cyber security requirements development, a section describing cyber security testing of 
synchrophasor system components, a section describing development of Snort rules, and 
finally, a section on future works and conclusions. 
3.2 Synchrophasor system cyber security requirements development 
Prior to testing a set of cybersecurity requirements and recommendations were 
prepared from review of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency 
Report (NISTIR) 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security: Vol. 2, Security 
Architecture and Security Requirements [3],  Department of Homeland Security (DHS): 
Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems [46], and utility internal 
requirements.  NISTIR 7628 Vol. 2 includes a process for deriving cyber security 
recommendations and requirements for smart grid systems.  NISTIR 7628 requirements 
and recommendations are taken from NIST SP 800-53 Revision 3 [47], the Department 
of Homeland Security Catalog of Control Systems Security: Recommendations for 
Standards Developers [48], NERC CIP (1-9) [2].  Each requirement is traceable to one or 
more of the aforementioned source documents.  
A cross functional team was formed to review and discuss cyber security 
requirements and recommendations. This team included representatives from the utility, 
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the vendor of phasor measurement unit and phasor data concentrator hardware, the 
vendor of the energy management system, bulk electric transmission system consultants, 
and a cyber security researcher from academia.  Team members included cyber security 
engineers, power system engineers, network communications engineers, hardware and 
software designers, and management representatives.  A subcommittee drafted an initial 
version of cyber security recommendations and requirements for the intended 
synchrophasor system.  The initial draft was circulated to the larger team for review.  
Finally, multiple meetings were held with all team members to discuss each proposed 
cyber security requirement in detail.  The resulting recommendations and requirements 
are included in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 list requirements 
pertinent to system hardware and software components.  
Requirements related to organization and management, physical protections, 
services acquisition, macro information system protection, risk management and 
assessment, personnel security, planning, maintenance, incident response, information 
and document management, configuration management, training, and security program 







Table 3.1 Recommendations and Requirements Derived from NISTIR 7628 [3] 





The synchrophasor system should enforce 
assigned authorizations for controlling access. 
AC-7 Least Privilege The synchrophasor system should assign and 
enforce the most restrictive set of rights and 
privileges or access needed by users for the 
performance of specified tasks. 
AC-8 Unsuccessful 
Login Attempts 
The synchrophasor system should enforce a 
defined number of consecutive invalid login 
attempts by a user during a defined time 
period. 




The synchrophasor system should display 
appropriate use banners where applicable.  
AC-10 Previous Logon 
Notification 
The synchrophasor system should notify the 
user, upon successful logon, of the date and 
time of the last logon and the number of 





Table 3.1 (Continued)  
NISTIR 7628  
Req. # 
Title Description 
AC-12 Session Lock The synchrophasor system should initiate a 
session lock after an organization-defined time 
period of inactivity or upon receiving a request 
from a user; and retain the session lock until 
the user reestablishes access. 
AC-21 Passwords The synchrophasor system should adhere to 
utility password complexity rules and 
passwords should be changed according to 
utility policy.  
AU-2 Auditable Events A set of auditable events should be developed 
for the synchrophasor system. The list should 
be revised based on current threat data, 
assessment of risk, and post-incident analysis. 
of risk, and post-incident analysis. 
AU-3 Content of Audit 
Records 
The synchrophasor system should produce 
audit records for each auditable event.  
AU-8 Time Stamps The synchrophasor system should use internal 





Table 3.1 (Continued)  
NISTIR 7628  
Req. # 
Title Description 
AU-9 Protection of Audit 
Information 
The synchrophasor system should protect audit 
information and audit tools from unauthorized 
access, modification, and deletion. 
AU-10 Audit Record 
Retention 
The synchrophasor system audit logs for a 
utility specified time period. 
AU-16 Non-Repudiation The synchrophasor system should protect 
against an individual falsely denying having 
performed a particular action. 




The utility must have the capability to recover 
and reconstitute the synchrophasor system to a 
known secure state after a disruption, 




The synchrophasor system should uniquely 
identify and authenticate devices before 
establishing a connection where technically 
feasible. 
SC-3 Security Function 
Isolation 
The synchrophasor system should isolate 





Table 3.1 (Continued) 





The synchrophasor system should mitigate or 
limit the effects of denial-of-service attacks 
based on an organization-defined list of denial-
of-service attacks. 
SC-7  Boundary 
Protection 
The synchrophasor system should be 




The Smart Grid information system protects the 




The synchrophasor system should protect the 
confidentiality of sensitive communicated 
information. 
SC-10 Trusted Path The synchrophasor system should establish a 
trusted communications path between the user 






Table 3.1 (Continued)  
NISTIR 7628  
Req. # 
Title Description 
SC-12 Use of Validated 
Cryptography 
All of the cryptography and other security 
functions that are required shall be NIST 
Federal Information Processing Standard 
(FIPS) approved. 
SC-19 Security Roles Specific security roles and responsibilities for 




The synchrophasor system should provide 
mechanisms to protect the authenticity of 
device-to-device communications. 
SC-22 Fail in Known 
State 
Devices and software used in synchrophasor 
system should fail in a known state to prevent 
loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 
SC-26 Confidentiality of 
Information at 
Rest 
Synchrophasor system hardware and software 
should employ cryptographic mechanisms for 
all critical security parameters to prevent 





Table 3.1 (Continued)  





The synchrophasor system should separate user 
functionality (including user interface services) 
from management functionality. 
 
NISTIR requirements address access control (AC), audit requirements (AU), 
continuity of operations (CP), identification and authentication (IA), and smart grid 
information system and communication protection (SC).  The requirements were derived 
using the NISTIR 7628 Logical Interface Category 3: Interface between control systems 
and equipment with high availability, without compute or bandwidth constraints. This 
interface category specifically includes communication interfaces between phasor 
measurement units and a wide area measurement system.  It was assumed that the 
synchrophasor system would eventually be used to source measurements to wide area 
protection system applications and therefore high availability was a requirement.  It was 
also assumed that new computer systems and new communication bandwidth would be 
added to support the synchrophasor system and therefore not compute or bandwidth 
constraints were assumed. 
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Table 3.2 Recommendations and Requirements Derived from DHS Cyber Security 
Procurement Language for Control Systems [46] 
Req. # Title Description 
PROC.1 System 
Hardening  
Vendor(s) shall list required ports and services for 
normal and emergency operation. 
PROC.2 Least Privilege Vendor(s) shall configure systems with least 
privilege file and account access and provide 
documentation of the configuration. 
PROC.3 Hardware 
Configuration 
Vendor(s) shall disable all unneeded communication 
ports and removable media drives. 
PROC.4 Upgrade 
Access Control 








Vendor(s) shall provide detailed information on all 
communications (including protocols) required 
through a firewall. 
PROC.7 Session 
Management 
Vendor(s) shall not permit user credentials to be 
transmitted in clear text. 
PROC.8 Concurrent 
Logins 
Vendor(s) shall not allow multiple concurrent logins, 
applications to retain login information between 
sessions, provide any auto-fill functionality during 
login, or allow anonymous logins. 
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Table 3.2 (Continued)  




Vendor(s) shall provide user account-based logout 
and timeout settings. 
PROC.10 Warning 
Banner 
A standard warning banner developed by the utility 
and must be displayed when users logon to a utility 
computer system and/or network. 
PROC.11 Least  Privilege System owners must restrict privileges for all users, 
interconnected systems, and software based on the 
principle of least privilege.  Where possible, system 
role accounts and programs must not run with 




Vendor(s) shall provide a configurable account 
password management system that allows for 
selection of password length, frequency of change, 
setting of required password complexity, number of 
login attempts, inactive session logout, screen lock by 
application, and denial of repeated or recycled use of 






Table 3.2 (Continued) 
Req. # Title Description 
PROC.13 Password 
storage 
Vendor(s) shall not store passwords electronically or 
in vendor-supplied hardcopy documentation in clear 




Vendor(s) shall provide a mechanism for rollback of 





Passwords must be encrypted using a utility approved 
cryptographic algorithm.   
PROC.16 Password 
Complexity 




Vendor(s) shall provide a system whereby account 
activity is logged and is auditable both from a 
management (policy) and operational (account use 
activity) perspective. 
PROC.18 Audit Log 
Time Stamping 
and Encryption 
Vendor(s) shall time stamp, encrypt, and control 






Table 3.2 (Continued)  
Req. # Title Description 




Vendor(s) shall ensure audit logging does not 
adversely impact system performance requirements. 
PROC.20 Audit Log 
Entry Contents 
Log data shall include the date and time of the event, 
the unique ID used to initiate the event, the type of 
event, success or failure, and the name of the object 
involved. 
PROC.21 User Accounts 
with Defined 
Role 
Vendor(s) shall provide for user accounts with 
configurable access and permissions associated with 




Vendor(s) shall provide physical and cyber security 
features, including but not limited to authentication, 
encryption, access control, event and communication 
logging, monitoring, and alarming to protect the 
device and configuration computer from 




The use of cryptographic algorithms must be limited 




3.3 Synchrophasor system cyber security component testing 
The cyber security requirements from the above section were applied to hardware, 
software, and communication systems throughout the synchrophasor system. A diagram 
was developed which included all system components and communication interfaces to 
each component. A sanitized version of the synchrophasor system component disgram is 
shown in Figure 3.1. The energy management system components depicted in this figure 
may not be complete but are necessary for adopting synchrophasor technology. This 
work provides a third party testing methodologies for phasor measurement unit (PMU), 
phasor data concentrator (PDC) and the energy management (EMS) system. The 
following sections give the cybersecurity testing procedures and methodologies for PMU 
and PDC. The testing results with vulnerabilities are ranked using a risk scale proprietary 
to the utility who grant this work.  
 




3.3.1 Testing environment configuration 
Three PMUs and one PDC were tested. A MU Dynamics MU-4000 Analyzer was 
used to perform denial of service, network congestion, and protocol mutation tests for 
well-known protocols such as TCP/IP etc. A personal computer (PC) was used with 
Wireshark to capture network traffic data logs and to host software used to configure and 
remotely control the PMU and PDC. The PMUs were connected to a Real Time Digital 
Simulator (RTDS) in a hardware-in-the-loop configuration. The RTDS provided 
simulated high voltage AC busses for the PMU’s to measure. PMUs were connected 
through a substation router to PDC. PDC concentrated synchrophasor measurement 
streams from the PMU and forwarded this data to an OpenPDC installation which served 
as a historian for the system. Noted that, there is another PC depicted as attacker’s, which 
is used to perform penetration testing such as Man-in-the-middle attacks and IEEE 
C37.118 protocol mutation tests. Figure 3.2 shows the test bed configuration. 
 




PMUs periodically measure voltage, current, and transmit voltage and current 
phasors (based upon a reference cosine waveform) at 120 samples per second. PMUs are 
time synchronized devices with clocks synchronized to Universal Time Coordinated 
(UTC) with 1 microsecond accuracy. Synchrophasor network packets are transmitted 
from the PMUs to a PDC. PMUs adhere to the IEEE C37.118 standard which specifies 
measurement requirements and the synchrophasor measurement format. PMUs may 
communicate over Ethernet or Serial port. Three PMU’s were tested for this work. PMU 
A and PMU B shared the same vendor, while PMU C was manufactured by a second 
vendor. All PMUs communicate over Ethernet using the IEEE C37.118 protocol. PDC 
collect synchrophasor streams from multiple PMU and create a single stream for 
retransmission to historian. PDC perform stream data rate conversion and can be 
configured to interpolate when data is missing from a stream. PDC adhere to the IEEE 
C37.118 standard and communicate over Ethernet. 
3.4 Cybersecurity testing 
3.4.1 Network congestion testing 
The MU-4000 Network Analyzer was used to perform network congestion 
testing. The MU-4000 denial of service test suite includes tests for multiple network 
protocols across all network OSI layers. The denial of service tests validate a device’s 
ability to withstand large volumes of traffic directed at the device. The relevant network 
protocols for testing PMU and PDC include various types of protocols in different 
ISO/OSI layers. 
Each network congestion test attempts to stress a separate portion of the device’s 
network stack. The tests target a device’s ability to process large volumes of a single type 
 
40 
of network traffic. The PMUs and PDC are usually based on embedded systems or 
simplified PC structure therefore contain limited memory which can be exhausted and 
lead to operating system exceptions, cause services to stall, and or cause the device to 
reset itself. A set of network layer tests send floods of ARP requests, PPPOE packets, and 
IPv4 packets to the target device. Network layer variations send random packets of all 
three types, IP packets with random sizes and random payload, and IP packets with large 
numbers of IP fragments. A set of ICMP tests were also used. ICMP tests send floods of 
ICMP echo requests (aka. Ping flood or Smurf attack), ICMP echo packets with large 
payloads, address mask requests, and source quench messages. 
Transport layer tests send floods of TCP and UDP packets to the device under 
test. TCP tests include variations which stress a device’s ability to create and teardown 
TCP sessions with floods of TCP SYN and TCP FIN packets targeting individual TCP 
ports and to random TCP ports. UDP tests include random headers and payloads to the 
UDP ports which are open in the target devices. 
Two tests validate device behavior for illegal packet types. A LAND test sends 
floods of IP packets with both the source and destination IP address set to the target’s IP 
address. A teardrop test sends fragmented IP packets which have overlapping IP 
fragments. 
All devices tested eventually became unresponsive when the traffic volume 
increases beyond that devices ability to process packets. Figure 3.3 shows typical device 
behavior to denial of service tests. The brown triangle shows the rate packets are being 
transmitted to the target device. As the tester ramps the packet rate it periodically sends 
the target an instrumentation packet (a query which the tested device is known to support) 
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to test if the device is able to respond. The instrumentation packet may be a TCP session 
request on a supported port or an ICMP echo request or any other type of packet the 
target is known to be capable of responding to. The blue vertical lines show the target 
device responding to instrumentation requests. A taller blue line indicates a slower 
response time. The red dots indicate failed instrumentation request. As the packet rate 
increases devices become unresponsive. Some devices may hang or reset themselves 
when subjected to high packet rates. Many devices are unresponsive during the test, but, 
become responsive again when the packet rate returns to acceptable levels. 
 
Figure 3.3 Denial of service test response time chart 
 
Understanding the packet rate which causes a device to become unresponsive is 
important for system planning and for creating an effective denial of service mitigation 
approach. Figure 3.4 shows a typical availability chart for a single denial of service test 
against a device. The availability shows the percent availability (Y-axis), percentage of 
time that a device is able to respond to instrumentation requests, versus packet 
transmission rate (X-axis). 
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The availability chart can be used by utility engineers and network administrators 
to define a maximum threshold for traffic congestion at the switch or router within the 
substation for the different traffic types. Based upon testing results it is recommended 
that utilities monitor network traffic volume in control system networks to detect 
transmission of high volumes of traffic. Monitoring systems should alert a human 
administrator to enable mitigation. Routers in the control system network may be 
configured to limit traffic sent to the PMU or PDC or may be configured to close ports 
sourcing offensive amounts of network traffic. Automatically closing router ports is 
potentially dangerous since critical traffic may use the port. A thorough system review 
should be performed before enabling automatic port closure. Maximum traffic rate 
thresholds should be defined for all relevant traffic types. 
 
Figure 3.4 Availability chart from congestion testing 
 
It is important to understand PMU and PDC behavior after DOS event completes. 
Testers should confirm that tested devices and network appliances in the route do not 
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queue large volume of IEEE C37.118 data packets which then leads to a synchrophasor 
stream which is perpetually delayed. PDC hold data from on time PMU to wait for data 
packets from late arriving PMU streams. A denial of service attack can have a persistent 
effect if the attacked PMU’s date stream becomes consistently late after the attack.  PDC 
eventually drop old data packets and begin to interpolate.  PMU and PDC which recover 
from a denial of service attack should clear their transmit queues to avoid the 
aforementioned effects. 
3.4.2 Protocol mutations 
A second method to test for denial of service vulnerabilities is through protocol 
mutation, also known as protocol fuzzing. Fuzzing is a general term for a type of 
software testing technology that uses unexpected input and monitors for exceptions for 
discovering faults in software. The results of fuzzing can help to ensure that exceptions 
can be handled appropriately, filter out unwanted values while allowing the full range of 
acceptable inputs [49]. In the rest of this chapter, it is abbreviated as fuzzing. The 
program that performs fuzzing work is called fuzzer. Two types of protocol mutation 
methods are used in this work. One is brute force fuzzing that creates network packets 
with random changes [49]. The fuzzer that implements brute force fuzzing starts from a 
valid sample of a protocol or data format and keeps mangling every individual bit or byte 
or word within the data packet. This type of fuzzing is pretty straightforward because all 
it needs to do is to modify the data and pass it along to the target. It requires little 
research to the format of the data massage and therefore it is also called “dumb fuzzing”. 
The other type of fuzzing is through manually modifying protocol packets 
according to how the protocol specification works and therefore it is relatively “smart”. 
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This type of fuzzing is called “smart fuzzing” in this work. In smart fuzzing each field in 
a mutated packet’s header, payload, and trailer is assigned a set of variant values that are 
designed specifically for the target. The selection of protocols for mutation testing was 
based on port scanning and device manual review results. Variant values for a field may 
include legal values and illegal values. The protocol mutation tester creates a set of 
packets which include all combinations of all fields with all variant values. The number 
of combinations grows quickly and protocol mutation can be a slow process. However, 
the benefit of protocol mutation, no matter dumb or smart is that combinations of packet 
fields which may not be thought of by a human can be tested to confirm that the device 
network stack does not hang or reset when the test packet is processed. Protocol mutation 
is intended to discover vulnerabilities before they are discovered by an adversary and 
become exploited zero day vulnerabilities. 
All communication protocols supported by a device are tested. Mutated protocols 
for the PMU and PDCs included ARP, TCP, UDP, IP, ICMP, DNP3, MODBUS, IEEE 
C37.118, and HTTP. The protocol mutation testing of these protocols are done using the 
MU 4000 Network analyzer except IEEE C37.118 where a fuzzing framework is 
developed. 
3.4.2.1 MU-4000 network analyzer 
The MU-4000 Network Analyzer was used to perform protocol mutation testing. 
As with the denial of service testing the tester sends groups of mutated packets to the 
target device.  The tester periodically sends instrumentation packets (queries which the 
tested device is known to support) to confirm that the device under test can still respond.  
Protocol mutation requires two types of instrumentation packets. The first 
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instrumentation is a communication packet and response pair which is known to work on 
the target device.  This instrumentation is typically unrelated to the mutated protocol.  
This instrumentation confirms the device network stack is still functioning and 
responsive. It is possible the portion of the network stack associated with the mutated 
protocol will hang without affecting other parts of the network stack.  For example, a 
UDP mutation may hang the UDP stack, but leave the TCP stack functioning correctly. 
The second instrumentation request type is a known good packet of the type being 
mutated.  This instrumentation confirms the portion of the network stack related to the 
mutated protocol is still functioning and responsive.   
Some services were capable of assignment to a variable TCP or UDP port 
number.  In this case, protocol mutation was repeated for multiple ports.  A good strategy 
for testing services with variable ports is to repeat testing with port assigned to multiple 
port numbers in the well known space (0-1023), multiple port numbers in the registered 
port range (1023-49151), and multiple port numbers in the private range (49152-65535). 
Some services are capable of assignment to a fixed set of port numbers.  In this case, it is 
good practice to test at all legal port assignments.  
The MU-4000 includes built-in protocol mutation capabilities for many well 
known protocols.  Some protocols are not supported.  For example, IEEE C37.118 is not 
natively supported.  Also, newly developed protocols may not initially be supported.  The 
MU-4000 is capable of learning protocols from Wireshark packet captures.   After 
learning a protocol the MU-4000 scenario builder can generate protocol mutations to test 
a device. The scenario builder feature was used for IEEE C37.118 protocol mutation. 
Only frames received as input by the target device should be mutated and sent to the 
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target device. Mutated IEEE C37.118 commands frames were mutated and sent to PMUs.  
Mutated IEEE C37.118 configuration and data frames were sent to the PDCs. 
Protocol Mutation testing may indentify individual packets which cause device 
failures including hanging network stacks or causing the device under test to reset itself.  
Protocol Mutation testing may also indentify combinations of packets which cause 
similar device failures.  In both cases careful study is required to determine the root cause 
of the failure.  Mitigation of detected vulnerabilities can be achieved with a firewall or 
signature based intrusion prevention system (IPS) rules to block problem traffic.  
Vulnerabilities identified using protocol mutation should also be reported to the device 
vendor. Protocol mutation identified multiple issues on devices tested for this work.  
Issues included crashing of individual network services, crashing of applications running 
on devices, and unintended soft resetting of affected devices.  
The MU-4000 works best as a client which sends mutated packets to a server.  
The MU-4000 uses randomization algorithms and constrained randomization algorithms 
to fuzz servers.  The MU-4000 is less capable of fuzzing server to client responses, 
especially responses which are dependent upon the previous packet sent from the client.  
To overcome this issue an in-line fuzzer was developed to mutate server to client packets.  
The current version of the in-line fuzzer simply varies random bits of the server to client 
response to attempt to break random protocol rules.  This method has proven effective at 
identifying vulnerabilities.  A fuzzer is needed which properly mutates server to client 
responses based upon previous client to server packets and system state.  The next section 
is analysis of the needs of such a fuzzer for IEEE C37.118 packets. 
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3.4.2.2 A fuzzing framework for IEEE C37.118 protocol 
The fuzzer for IEEE C37.118 protocol must be able to fuzz server to client 
responses, especially responses which are dependent upon the previous packet sent from 
the client. To achieve this a fuzzing framework was developed to mutate server to client 
packets. The current version of the fuzzing framework is able to perform both dumb 
fuzzing and smart fuzzing for IEEE C37.118 packets. Dumb fuzzing flips bits of the 
server-to-client response to attempt to break random protocol rules, while smart fuzzing 
mangles the specific fields of data packets according to the protocol specifications.  
The fuzzing framework is designed based on the communication patterns of the 
IEEE C37.118 protocol. The fuzzing framework mutates server to client responses based 
upon previous client to server packets and system state. There are four types of packets 
defined in IEEE C37.118 protocol [50]: header, command, configuration, and data. The 
communication pattern between PMU and PDC is depicted in Figure 3.5 where PMU is 
the server and PDC is the client. The IEEE C37.118 protocol is an application layer 
protocol that can be carried in the TCP payload or UDP payload. Since UDP protocol is 
much faster and easy to implement, in this testing the communication between the PMU 
and PDC is configured to use IEEE C37.118 based on UDP. Communication is initiated 
by the PDC (i.e. client) through sending a command frame that tells the PMU (i.e. server) 
to start to stream measurements to the PDC. The command frame can also deliver other 
commands such as a stop command, request configuration frame command, and others. 
The PMU which receives the start command then knows where to send its C37.118 
packets. However, before sending the data frames the PMU sends a configuration frame 
to the PDC in which the PMU communicates the organization and size of its data frames. 
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There are two types of configuration frames: configuration frame 1 and configuration 
frame 2. The configuration frame 1 contains the constant part of the PMU configuration 
and therefore it usually needs to be sent only once the first time PMU is connected to 
PDC. The configuration frame 2 contains a variable part of the PMU configuration e.g. 
number of phasors. Hence the configuration frame 2 has to be sent every time the PMU is 
connected to the PDC such that PDC will know whether there are changes in the PMU 
and update them. The PMU then starts to send the data frames at a rate ranging from 30 
to 120 frames per second. The data frame contains real time phasor data e.g. magnitude, 
phase angle, frequency, analog, digital data. The Header frame contains up to 80 
characters of human readable/ASCII with comments on the PMU, the data sources, 
scaling algorithms or any other information. The Header frame is rarely used. 
PMU PDC
   Command Frame
  Configuration Frame 1/2
  Data Frame
  Header Frame
 
Figure 3.5 PMU and PDC communication pattern 
 
Only frames received as input by the target device should be mutated and sent to 
the target device for the purpose of testing whether the target can handle the mutated 
packets properly. According to different synchrophasor devices since each of them 
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accepts different frames shown by the arrows in Figure 3.5, different fuzzing strategies 
are used. For testing the PDC, three types of frames should be considered: configuration 
frame 1 or 2, data frame, and the header frame. As for the PMU, the command frame and 
the header frame are mutated for testing. 
A typical fuzzing framework usually consists of three parts: test case generation; 
target monitoring, and logging pertinent data on failure [49]. A fuzzing framework for 
network protocols requires a tool to capture valid protocol traffic [51]. One such tool can 
be a sniffer that dynamically captures the network packets at runtime. The structure of the 
fuzzing framework designed for IEEE C37.118 protocol is shown in Figure 3.6. The 
fuzzing framework is executed on a Linux computer that connects to the substation 
switch. The fuzzing framework consists of five major parts: man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
server, protocol parser, fuzzing engine, validation engine and log, in which the MITM 
server captures the IEEE C37.118 protocol packets; the fuzzing engine generates the test 
cases; validation engine monitors the devices under test and log stores not only the test 




Figure 3.6 Structure of the fuzzing framework for IEEE C37.118 protocol 
 
The MITM server is implemented using Ettercap . Ettercap is a sniffer written in 
C language that features passive and active sniffing in the communication channel, 
content filtering on the fly and many other MITM attacks. The Ettercap in this fuzzer 
redirects all the packets between PMU and PDC to the fuzzing framework PC by 
spoofing the Media Access Control (MAC) addresses of the PMU and PDC such that it 
pretends to be the PMU for the PDC and pretends to be the PDC for the PMU. This is 
achieved by sending the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) packets to the victim 




















the IEEE C37.118 packets off the wire, layers the new IEEE C37.118 packets onto UDP 
packets and finally transmits the new packets onto the network. The new IEEE C37.118 
packet has its fields altered according to the type of fuzzing chosen. The content of IEEE 
C37.118 packet is modified using Scapy [54]. Scapy is an open source Python program 
that provides a Domain Specific Langurage (DSL) that enables the users to describe any 
kind of packet using the Python syntax and interpreter. In the fuzzing framework, Scapy 
is used to accomplish IEEE C37.118 packet assembly, packet editing, packet re-play and 
packet decoding.  
When an IEEE C37.118 packet is captured by the MITM server, it hands the 
packet to the “protocol parser” where the packet is decoded into one of the four types of 
the IEEE C37.118 frames. The protocol parser is a Python module that has been 
developed to describe the IEEE C37.118 protocol based on DSL provided by Scapy. The 
frame type field is examined to determine which type of IEEE C37.118 frames the packet 
belongs to. Then the packet will be forwarded to the corresponding fuzzer for mutations 
by the “fuzzing engine”.  
The fuzzing engine is composed of four frame fuzzers that mutate different types 
of IEEE C37.118 frames. Each frame fuzzer accomplishes packet editing by applying 
either dumb fuzzing or smart fuzzing to the packet. The smart fuzzing has predefined 
mutations to the fields of the packet according to the protocol standard. For example, the 
field FRAMESIZE of the packet is changed such that it does not match the actual size of 
that packet [56]. Besides the common fields that all types of frames have, each type of 
frame also has its unique fields. For example, the IEEE C37.118 command frame has two 
unique fields. One of them is the CMD field that is a 2 bytes field specifying the 
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command. There are 6 defined values for this field. However, a smart fuzzer for 
command frame is designed to replace the CMD with a value that is not one of the 6 legal 
values.  
3.4.2.2.1 Smart fuzzing 
Smart fuzzing mutates the packets based on the protocol specifications. IEEE 
C37.118 includes 4 types of packets; header, command, configuration, and data.  Header 
and command packets are transmitted from the PDC to the PMU. Configuration and 
command packets are transmitted from the PMU to the PDC.  
All 4 frame types include a 2 byte synchronization word (SYNC).  The first byte 
of the SYNC is defined as always 0xAA.  It is important to check other values for this 
field. The second byte of the SYNC field includes a reserved bit, 3 bits to designate the 
frame type, and 4 bits for version number. There are 5 legal frame types.  Illegal frame 
types should be sent; 0b101, 0b110, 0b111.   All 16 possible version number possibilities 
should be sent; though only some have been defined to date. All 4 IEEE C37.118 frame 
types include a 2 byte frame size field.  Frames should be sent with frame sizes which do 
not match the actual FRAMESIZE.  Also, very large frame sizes should be sent to test for 
buffer overflow possibilities. A 4 frame types include a 2 byte IDCODE field.  This value 
is the PMU or PDC ID number.  The values 0 and 65535 are reserved and therefore 
should be tested.  PMU and PDC typically have preprogrammed ID values. Frames with 
IDCODE values not assigned to the target device should be tested.  All 4 IEEE C37.118 
frame types include a 4 byte SOC field. The SOC field is a time stamp that counts the 
number of seconds since Jan-01-1970. The field is limited to 136 years which means the 
max value is 0xB34C00.  Above 0xB34C00 the count is supposed to roll over.  It is 
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important to test values greater than 0xB34C00.  All 4 IEEE C37.118 frame types include 
a 4 byte FRACSEC field. This field is broken into two parts.  The most significant 4 bits 
of FRACSEC (bits 31-28) are used to document the presence of a leap second. Bit 31 is 
reserved and therefore transmitting a 1 in this bit should be tested. Bits 30 (LEAP) 
indicates a leap second is occurring. Bit 29 (LEAPED) indicates a leap second occurred 
in the last 24 hours. Bit 28 (TOLEAP) indicates a leap second will occur in the next 
second.  Various fuzzing scenarios can be derived for these fields.  First, the leap second 
bits should be asserted at times and dates when they are not expected. Seconds, LEAP 
should be set without first setting TOLEAP in the previous second. LEAP should be set 
without setting LEAPED in the following second and 24 hours. TOLEAP should be set 
with no following LEAP assertion.  LEAPED should be asserted when not preceded by 
TOLEAP or LEAD combinations.  Finally, all three bits (LEAP, LEAPED, TOLEAP) 
should be asserted at random times. The next 4 bits of FRACSEC  (bits 27-24) are 
defined by a table to indicate clock faults and clock synchronization values.  There are 
multiple reserved values (0b1100, 0b1101, 0b1110) which should be tested.  The 
remainder of the FRACSEC field is a number fraction of a second.  This value is 
depended upon the TIMEBASE value from the PMU configuration frame. This value can 
be changed when configuring the PMU.  FRACSEC values which do not match with the 
programmed TIMEBASE should be tested. Finally, All 4 IEEE C37.118 frame types 
include a 2 byte CHK field which is a 16-bit CRC.  Frames with invalid CRC values 
should be tested. Some fuzzers make changes to valid packets by randomly flipping bit 
values.  In this case the fuzzer should ensure that the CHK field is correct to ensure that 
more that the CRC logic is being tested. 
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The IEEE C37.118 data frame has multiple unique fields. Since data frames are 
transmitted from the PMU to PDC fuzzing data frames is limited to the PDC. The STAT 
field is a 2 byte field which provides PMU status.  This field includes multiple reserved 
and user defined bits. All combinations of these bits should be tested. The PHASORS, 
FREQ, DFREQ, ANALOG, and DIGITAL fields all vary in size according to values in 
the configuration frame.    The configuration frame is sent from the PMU to PDC during 
initial session start-up. Tests should include varying the number of values in these fields 
to not match the configuration frame definitions.  Variation should include 0 bytes, 
larger, and smaller number of bytes for each field.  PDC concentrate multiple 
synchrophasor streams from PMU into a single stream of IEEE C37.118 data frames. As 
such the size of the data frames output from PDC varies according to the number of PMU 
which is defined in a configuration from sent from the PDC to its upstream client, an 
EMS, state estimator, or openPDC. It is important to test varying data frame sizes.  Very 
large sizes should be tested to check for buffer overflow vulnerabilities.  Also, it is 
important to test data frame sizes which do not match the configuration frame. 
The IEEE C37.118 configuration frame has multiple unique fields. Since 
configuration frames are transmitted from the PMU to PDC fuzzing data frames is 
limited to the PDC. Fuzzing PDC configuration frames is a challenge because the PDC 
typically requests the configuration frame only once when the session is initiated. The 
PDC can be forced to request a configuration frame update by asserting bit 10 in the 
STAT word of a data frame send from the PMU to PDC.  Bit 10 of the STAT word 
indicates the configuration has changed and the PDC should request to read the 
configuration files.  The TIME_BASE field is 4 bytes.  The most significant byte of 
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TIME_BASE is reserved.  Tests should be conducted with these bits set to non legal 
values (0-255).  The NUM_PMU field 2 byte field which specifies the number of PMU in 
a data frame.  This field can legally be up to 65535.  However, the actual limit is less than 
65535 since the maximum FRAMESIZE is 65535.  The actual limit depends upon the 
values of PHNMR, ANNMR, DGNMR, and FORMAT which set the number of phasors, 
analog values, digital values, and format of said values for each PMU in the frame.  
Testing combinations of NUM_PMU and the PHNMR, ANNMR, DGNMR, and 
FORMAT which result in greater than 65535 bytes in the data frame is important.  Also, 
testing combinations of NUM_PMU and PHNMR, ANNMR, DGNMR, and FORMAT 
which result in do not match the data in the data frames is important.  The CHNAM field 
is specified as 16*(PHNMR+ ANNMR +16 *DGNMR).  Testing combinations of 
CHNAM, PHNMR, ANNMR, and DGNMR which do not adhere to the previous 
definition is important.  The FORMAT field specifies the data type of FREQ, DFREQ, 
PHASORS, and ANALOG fields from the data frame.  Testing combinations of 
FORMAT which do not match the values in the FREQ, DFREQ, PHASORS, and 
ANALOG fields in the data frame is important. Bits 15-4 of the FORMAT field are 
reserved.  Testing non-zero fields in this field is important. The PHUNIT field of the 
configuration frame is 4 bytes.   The most significant byte has legal values of 0 or 1. 
Testing should be completed to send values 2-255 in this byte.  The ANUNIT field is a 4 
byte field. The most significant byte of this field has several constraints. Values 3-4 are 
undefined by the specification. Values 5-64 are reserved. Values 65-255 are user 
definable. All values from 3-255 should be tested. THE DIGUNIT is 4 byte mask of the 
DIGITAL field from the data frame. Bits 63-48 and 32-16 are a mask which indicates the 
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normal status of the digital bit corresponding to that bit lane. Test should be conducted to 
change normal status bit values for bits not in use in the DIGITAL field of the data frame. 
Test should also be conducted to inverts the normal value for bits which are in use in the 
DIGITAL field in the data frame. Bits 47-33 and 15-0 are masks which indicate which 
bytes are in use. Tests should be conducted to deselect DIGITAL field bits which are 
actually in use and select DIGITAL field bits which are not actually in use.  The FNOM 
field is a 2 byte field which sets the nominal frequency. Only two values are allowed 0 
and 1. Tests should be conducted for values from 2-65535. The DATA_RATE field is a 2 
byte signed integer representing the number of frames per second. Typically this value 
will be 30, 60 or 120 frames per second. However, the legal values are [-32767, 32767].  
Testing should be conducted for multiple values throughout this range.  Additionally, the 
value 0x8000 should also be tested since it fits in the field but is not specified as legal 
since it is effectively -0. CFGCNT is a 2 byte field which indicates the number of 
configuration changes since installation.  This value should be varied out of order and 
changed to large values to test PDC response. 
The IEEE C37.118 command frame has two unique fields. Command frames are 
sent to PMU. Command frames may also be sent to the upstream facing interface of the 
PDC.  The CMD field is a 2 byte field specifying the command.  There are 6 defined 
values for this field.  Undefined values should be sent to the device to test behavior. 
EXITFRAME is a variable length field from 0-65518 bytes.  This size is limited by the 
FRAMESIZE field in the command frame.  The value of EXITFRAME is user defined.  
Tests should be conducted to send non-zero size EXITFRAMEs.  Also, test should be 
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conducted in which the FRAMZSIZE is too large or too small based upon the size of the 
EXITFRAME field. 
The IEEE C37.118 header frame has one type of unique field. Header frames are 
read from the PMU and therefore fuzzing of header frames is directed at the PMU.  The 
header frame may have up to K ASCII bytes of data.  The number of bytes of data is the 
FRAMESIZE – 16.  The maximum number of data bytes is therefore 65519.  Header 
frames should be tested with non-ASCII characters in the data bytes of a header frame. 
Header frames with non-printable characters should also be tested in the data byte fields.  
Finally, testing should be conducted when the FRAMESIZE specified incorrect for the 
number of data bytes transmitted. 
3.4.2.2.2 Dumb fuzzing 
Dumb fuzzing perform packet mutation without knowing the protocol 
specifications. Therefore, a dumb fuzzer create test cases by flipping bits in a capture 
packet. In this work, the dumb fuzzing is implemented through a file fuzzer – ZZUF [53]. 
ZZUF was originally designed as an application input fuzzer that intercepts file 
operations and changes random bits in the program’s inputs. Therefore ZZUF has no 
ability to mutate network packets. To resolve this, the about-to-be-mutated IEEE C37.118 
packet is written into a temporary file as binary strings. Instead of fuzzing the packet, the 
binary file is mutated by ZZUF. The output from ZZUF is layered upon a UDP packet 
and forwarded by the MITM server to the target.  
How ZZUF mutates the binary file is exclusively determined by two of its 
parameters: fuzzing ratio and seeds. This feature of ZZUF is convenient to the tester for 
easily reproducing the mutated packets and later replaying the bugs. The fuzzing ratio 
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indicates the proportion of bits that ZZUF changes. A fuzzing ratio of 1/command frame 
length (bits) was used to cause ZZUF to invert 1 bit per fuzzed packet. The fuzzing ratio 
is approximate. The actual test results show each packet had 1-10 randomly changed bits. 
The fuzzing results can be reproducible by specifying the “seed” parameter if the ratio is 
fixed. For example, if the ratio is fixed to 0.01 which means 1% of bits in the packet are 
inverted, the seed number 1 will always choose the same bits for inversion by ZUFF. 
Therefore, if a mutated packet crashes the target device, we are able to reproduce this 
packet if we recorded the original packet and the ratio and seed. This task is done by the 
logging system of the fuzzing framework. The logging system records all activities of the 
fuzzing framework as well as the malicious packets that crash a device under test.  
The validation system starts sending validation packets through the MITM server 
after each mutated packet being sent to the target. There are two methods in this 
framework to validate whether the target survives the malicious input: Internet Control 
Message Protocol (ICMP) echo and HTTP request. The first method is suitable for all 
types of devices that are networked to the switch while the second method is only 
available to the devices that are running an HTTP server. The ICMP validation sends 
ICMP echo request packets and expects a response from the target device. The HTTP 
validation sends a “GET” request and expects the webserver to return a webpage. The 
tester can choose either or both as the validation method. If the target device fails to 
respond to the ICMP request or HTTP GET request it will be regarded as a crash and 
then the original packet (packet before being mutated) is recorded in the file system and 
the ratio and seed information about ZZUF is logged for the future analysis. 
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3.4.2.2.3 Fuzzing algorithms for different IEEE C37.118 frames 
This section describes four algorithms to mutate IEEE C37.118 frames using both 
smart fuzzing and dumb fuzzing via ZUFF. The fuzzing ratio for ZUFF is fixed such that 
only 1 bit of the frame is flipped. 
3.4.2.2.3.1 Configuration Frame Fuzzing 
The configuration frame fuzzer alters data frames and forwards these altered 
configuration frames to the device under test, i.e. PDC. Before the fuzzing starts the 
connection between PMU and PDC needs to be established. This is done by the MITM 
server by examining whether data frames streaming from the PMU to PDC have been 
captured. To provide a large set of fuzzable configuration frames the MITM server makes 
a change data frames request. A data frame has its STATUS field changed to value of 
0x0004. This informs the PDC that the configuration of PMU has been changed and thus 
the PDC should send a command frame requesting the new configuration frame. The 
approach to fuzz a configuration frame is shown in Table 3.3. 
3.4.2.2.3.2 Data Frame Fuzzing 
The data frame fuzzer alters data frames and forwards these altered data frames to 
the device under test, i.e. PDC. Data frame fuzzing only requires a connection between 
PMU and PDC to be established before running the MITM server. The algorithm for 
fuzzing the data frame is listed in Table 3.4. 
3.4.2.2.3.3 Command Frame Fuzzing 
The command frame fuzzer alters command frames and forwards these altered 
command frames to the device under test, i.e. PMU. A simple way to provide a large set 
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of fuzzable command frames is to use SCAPY to generate a normal command frame 
from which the mutated command frames are created. This is done by the protocol parser. 
In this case the MITM server does not necessarily need to perform ARP spoofing to 
intercept the connection between PMU and PDC. Instead, the MITM server initiates the 
connection to PDC by sending a “Transmission On” command. The PMU responds to 
this command by starting to stream data frames. When the fuzzer detects the connection 
between the MITM server and PDC has been established the fuzzing process starts. 
Besides the two validation methods, ICMP echo request and HTTP GET request, there is 
one more way to inspect whether the target device survived the command frame fuzzing. 
This is through examining whether the target device continues streaming data frames. 
This is necessary because it is possible that the device’s network stack is working 
properly (by responding ICMP echo request) but the Synchrophasor processing unit has 
crashed due to the fuzzing. However, this validation is not suitable for fuzzing the 
command “Transmission Off” as this command is originally used to stop the streaming. 
Algorithm 3 lists the approach to fuzz a command frame. There are 6 types of command 
frames: “Transmission On”; “Transmission Off”; “Send Header”; “Send Configure frame 
1”; “Send Configure frame 2” and “Send extra frames”. To fuzz all 6 types of frames a 
loop is created between step 2 and step 16 such that the protocol parser can create the 6 
types of command frames. The algorithm for fuzzing command frames are summarized 
in Table 3.5. 
3.4.2.2.3.4 Header Frame Fuzzing 
The header frame fuzzer alters header frames and forwards these altered header 
frames to the device under test, i.e. PDC. This fuzzing can performed after the connection 
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between PMU and PDC is established. To provide a large set of fuzzable header frames, 
a command frame that requests a header frame from PMU needs to be created by the 
fuzzer and sent to the PMU. This informs the PMU to send a header frame from which 




Table 3.3 Algorithm for configuration frame fuzzing 




1: Initiate fuzzing ratio and set seed number to 0. 
2: MITM server captures a packet and hands to Protocol Parser 
3: if the packet is data frame: 
4:   MITM server alters data frame to cause 
configuration frame transmission.  
5:  go back to step 2 
6: elseif the packet is configuration frame: 
7:  ZZUF alters bits in the frame OR smart fuzzer for 
deliberate changes in specific fields 
8: else go back to step 2 
9: MITM server forwards altered frame to device under test. 
10: Validation Engine sends ICMP echo request or/and HTTP GET 
request to the device. 
11: if responses are captured: 
12:  (device survived) pass 
13: else  recorder the configuration frame, fuzzing ratio and 
the seed number. 
14: Increase seed number by 1 
15: if seed number == maximum seed number: 
16:   stop fuzzing 
17: else  go to step 2 
 
63 
Table 3.4 Algorithm for data frame fuzzing approach 




1: Initiate fuzzing ratio and set seed number to 0. 
2: MITM server captures a packet and hands to Protocol Parser 
3: if the packet is data frame: 
4:   ZZUF alters bits in the frame OR smart fuzzer makes 
deliberate changes in specific fields. 
5: else  go back to step 2 
6: MITM server forwards altered frame to device under test. 
7: Validation Engine sends ICMP echo request or/and HTTP GET 
request to the device. 
8: if responses are captured: 
9:  (device survived) pass 
10: else  recorder the data frame, fuzzing ratio and the seed 
number. 
11: Increase seed number by 1 
12: if seed number == maximum seed number: 
13:   stop fuzzing 
14: else  go to step 2 
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Table 3.5 Algorithm for command frame fuzzing 
Algorithm 3 command frame fuzzing approach 
 
  
1: Initiate fuzzing ratio and set seed number to 0. 
2: MITM server sends a “Transmission on” command 
3: if the received packet is NOT data frame: 
4:   go to step 2 
5: else:   
6:   Protocol Parser creates a normal command frame 
7: ZZUF alters random bits in the frame or smart 
fuzzer makes deliberate changes in specific fields 
8:  MITM server forwards altered frame to device under 
test. 
9:  Validation Engine sends ICMP echo request or/and 
HTTP GET request to the device. 
10:  if responses and data frames (not suitable for 
“Transmission off” command) are captured: 
11:   (device survived) pass 
12:  else  recorder the command frame, fuzzing ratio and 
the seed number. 
13:   Increase seed number = seed number + 1 
14:   if seed number == maximum seed number: 
15:    stop fuzzing 
16:   else  go to step 2 
 
65 
Table 3.6 Algorithm for header frame fuzzing 
Algorithm 4 header frame fuzzing approach 
 
  
1: Initiate fuzzing ratio and set seed number to 0. 
2: MITM server captures a packet and hands to Protocol Parser 
3: if the packet is data frame: 
4:   MITM server sends a command frame to cause header 
frame transmission. Then go to step 2 
5: elseif the packet is header frame: 
6:  ZZUF alters bits in the frame OR smart fuzzer for 
deliberate changes in specific fields 
7: else go to step 2 
8: MITM server forwards altered frame to device under test. 
9: Validation Engine sends ICMP echo request or/and HTTP GET 
request to the device. 
10: if responses are captured: 
11:  (device survived) pass 
12: else  recorder the configuration frame, fuzzing ratio and 
the seed number. 
13: Increase seed number = seed number + 1 
14: if seed number == maximum seed number: 
15:   stop fuzzing 
16: else  go to step 2 
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The structure of the in-line fuzzer is also suitable for fuzzing other network 
protocols. As long as the protocol to be fuzzed is an open standard a corresponding 
protocol parser can be developed. This is referred to as “white box” testing. For 
proprietary protocols in which protocol specification is unavailable only dumb fuzzing is 
possible. The next section provides a methodology to fuzz a typical energy management 
system in which an intelligent dumb fuzzing framework is proposed. 
3.4.3 Energy management system fuzzing framework 
The energy management system (EMS) consists of a set of computer applications 
and databases that help operators in electricity utilities perform monitoring, control, and 
optimization of the performance of the electricity power grid. In general, the EMS system 
structure is shown in Figure 3.7 where the client is an application programming interface 
(API) that provides a human machine interface (HMI) to the operators. The client API 
communicates with different applications that may be located in a super server. Each 
application performs corresponding analysis and calculation according to the requests 
from the client. Multiple applications may run simultaneously. The databases provide 
necessary data and operations descriptions for the applications and they can be running in 
the same super server or distributed in different super servers. The communication 
between the client API and applications usually uses proprietary protocols that are not 
open to the public. The EMS system fuzzing framework in this work is meant to test 
applications within the EMS system that listen on a network interface of the super server. 
The fuzzer sends anomalous input to attempt to crash EMS applications in order to reveal 
the security vulnerabilities of the EMS system. The structure of fuzzing framework is not 
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only limited to EMS super server but also could be used as a network fuzzer to any other 
distributed database systems. 
The test bed for testing the proposed fuzzing framework has one client machine 
and one super server. This test bed assumes that client can be run either remotely or 
locally along with an application. The test bed also assumes that the tester is able to 
access the application machine and source code for the purpose of debugging. In 
addition, the assumption that the protocol does not have checksum validation or the 
checksum is disabled in the communication is necessary. 
 
Figure 3.7 A general structure for EMS system 
 
Client (Human-machine Interface)
DB 1 DB n
...




The fuzzing framework for the EMS system is based on the Basic Fuzzing 
Framework (BFF) [55]. The BFF was originally designed to test applications running 
locally on Linux and Mac OS X platforms. The fuzzing framework designed for this 
work aims to test applications running over a network with the proprietary protocol. 
Nevertheless, the design is consistent with the four functions of a typical fuzzing 
framework as stated in the previous section. The structure of the fuzzing framework is 
depicted in Figure 3.8. The fuzzing method for this framework is limited to dumb fuzzing 
because the protocol specifications are not available. And the fuzzing framework fuzzes 
application layer protocols carried by the TCP/IP protocol. 
 
Figure 3.8 Structure of fuzzing framework for fuzzing EMS system super server 
 
The fuzzing framework runs on the super server along with the EMS applications. 













fuzzer: ZZUF; Debug Agent and the log. The applications running on the super server are 
the targets of all fuzzing tests. The applications are configured to listen on ports of the 
local network interface (127.0.0.1) of the super server. The client (10.0.0.1) in Figure 3.8 
(outside the boundary of super server) is configured to communicate with the super 
server over the local area network at 10.0.0.2. However, rather than using a sniffer as 
with the fuzzing framework for the IEEE C37.118 protocol, the MITM server is a multi-
threaded process that runs on the super server and listens to TCP ports associated with IP 
address of 10.0.0.2. When the client sends requests to 10.0.0.2, one of the threads of 
MITM server captures these packets and forwards them to the application that is listening 
to the destination port. The MITM server then will act like a proxy for relaying traffic 
from the client to appropriate application on the super server. The fuzzer ZZUF mutates 
packets captured by the MITM server and ZUFF is controlled by the fuzzing engine 
according to some algorithm. In the engine configuration file, parameters for ZZUF are 
specified such as start seed and maximum seed. A debug agent with local access to the 
application source code is attached to the application process to detect when an exception 
is raised. The debug agent uses GDB. When GDB detects a program exit number other 
than 9 (which is normal exit). It records the debugging information to the log and also 
communicates with the fuzzing engine to record the packet along with seed number and 
fuzzing range. 
3.5 Developing Snort rules for detecting attacks 
Snort rules are capable of tracking the number of packets from a given source in a 
specified time period.  Such Snort rules can alert if a flooding attack is detected. A SYN 
flood rule for an IEEE C37.118 interface should take into account the normal and 
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extraordinary, yet still valid, volumes of traffic expected on the network interface.  In 
normal operation, using IEEE C37.118, the PDC sends commands to the PMU to request 
a configuration file. The PMU responds with a configuration file and then begins to 
stream synchrophasor measurements, data packets, at 30, 60, or 120 packets per second.    
This process should generate one TCP session and therefore only one TCP SYN packet 
should be sent per synchrophasor session.  A PDC may connect to multiple PMU and 
therefore may have multiple active TCP sessions on port 4712, the port assigned for 
IEEE C37.118.  PMU and PDC also commonly have other TCP services.  Each open port 
of the tested PMU and PDC was tested with TCP SYN flood attacks.  In all case devices 
were 100% responsive to TCP SYN floods of less than or equal to 1000 packets per 
second. The two rules below detect TCP SYN flood attacks against any port on PMU or 
PDC.  The rules alert for more than 1000 TCP packets in one second. This threshold 
value can likely be significantly decreased without causing spurious alerts. 
 
alert tcp any any -> $PDCIP any (msg:“Syn Flood to PDC”;\  
flags:S,CE; flow:to_server; threshold: type threshold, 
track by_src, count 1000, seconds 1; priority:3; 
sid:1000001;) 
 
alert tcp any any -> $PMUIP any (msg:“Syn Flood to PMU”;\  
flags:S,CE; flow:to_server; threshold: type threshold, 




Flooding attacks performed in device testing included ARP floods, IP floods, TCP 
SYN floods, TCP SYN FIN floods, UDP floods, ICMP floods.  In each case SNORT 
rules can be derived to detect the floods.   
Protocol mutation testing was performed with the MU-4000. Protocol mutation, 
also known as fuzzing, checks device response to broken protocol rules.  Protocol 
mutation can be performed at any network layer.  In this section we provide 
MODBUS/TCP and IEEE C37.118 protocol mutation examples. 
One MODBUS/TCP device tested reset itself when the LENGTH field of was less 
than the actual length remainder of the MODBUS/TCP packet.  The rule below confirms 
that the specified bytes remaining are actually in the packet.  This rule was taken from a 
rule set developed by Digital Bond [57]. 
 
alert tcp $MODBUS_SERVER 502 <> $MODBUS_CLIENT any 
(flow:established;\ 
byte_jump:2,4; isdataat:0,relative; msg:"SCADA_IDS: Modbus TCP - 
\ 
Incorrect Packet Length, Possible DOS Attack"; \ 
reference:url,digitalbond.com/tools/quickdraw/Modbus-tcp-rules; \ 
classtype:non-standard-protocol; sid: 1000003; rev:1; 
priority:2;) 
 
Because much of this work was done under confidentiality agreement, other Snort 
rules written were not included in this chapter as they would indirectly divulge the 
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vulnerabilities identified in testing. In addition, a set of Snort rules are developed for 
malicious C37.118 packets as in [58], which were validated by aforementioned fuzzer. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, cyber security testing methodologies for synchrophasor system are 
provided. Results of the testing were reported to the sponsoring electric utilities and to 
the hardware and software vendors to aid in understanding the impacts of cyber-attacks to 
the synchrophasor system and assist vendors and the utility to deploy defense 
mechanisms. Two fuzzing frameworks for network protocol and distributed computing 
systems were developed to identify vulnerabilities of synchrophsor devices and the 
energy management system. Different fuzzing methodologies were used depending on 
different characteristics of the target under test. The fuzzing frame work for IEEE 
C37.118 protocol can be used as an attack tool that modifies measurements carried by 
IEEE C37.118 data frames. Additionally, the fuzzer for IEEE C37.118 data frames can be 
easily changed to modify any value in C37.118 data frames but make the data frames still 
compliant with the protocol specification. Such frames therefore may not be detected by a 





DETECTION FOR FAULT AND CYBER ATTACK IN POWER SYSTEM BY 
MINING SYNCHROPHASOR DATA 
4.1 Introduction 
Situational awareness technologies have been studied and continuously improved 
for decades. The need to continue situational awareness improvements is motivated by 
recent power disturbances which have led to large scale blackouts [59]. A power system 
disturbance, such as a transmission line fault, can initiate a chain of reactions which lead 
to a cascading blackout if timely actions from operators are not taken. Poor visibility 
across the power system may also cause the significance of an event to be misunderstood 
and lead to incorrect control actions by operators in control centers. Additionally, as 
power systems increasingly depend on communication infrastructures to provide the 
wide-area monitoring and control, power systems are exposed to the threat of cyber-
attacks. Cyber-attacks are another form of power system contingency. Attacks that target 
power systems can exploit vulnerabilities in control devices and communication links to 
corrupt the control and measurement signals [7][60], and interrupt monitoring algorithms 
[67]. Cyber-attacks which corrupt control and measurement signals can be disguised as 
power system disturbances or control actions. Situational awareness technologies are 
needed which distinguish between actual power system disturbances related to natural 
events, and cyber-attacks. The emphasis of this work is not on classifying disturbance 
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types as quite a number of methods have been proposed to do so in the power system, but 
on distinguishing between disturbances and cyber-attacks. There are three reasons it is 
important to distinguish disturbances from cyber-attacks. First, in the case that a cyber-
attack impersonates a disturbance or control action, proper classfication will lead to 
proper response. Calssifying a cyber-attack as a disturbance or control action can lead to 
improper response and cause an outage or other negative impact on the power system. 
Conversely, incorrectly classifying a disturbance or control action as a cyber-attack can 
lead to improper response within the information and communications technology (ICT) 
system. Second, a single classifer which idenitfies all types of power system 
contingiences is needed as an input to automated event response algorithms such as 
autonomic management frameworks, system integrity protection schemes (SIPS) [13], 
and wide area protection systems (WAPS) [12]. This work presents a methodology to 
mine the patterns for disturbances and cyber-attacks using a two-dimensional graph from 
logged heterogenuous system data, use common paths in the graph as signatures of each 
type of modeled scenario, and finally, to classify specific disturbances and cyber-attacks. 
For proof of concept, in this work we consider disturbances as different types of line-to-
ground and line-to-line faults. 
A new trend in power system situation awareness is the use of high-speed and 
time-synchronized data. Compared to traditional supervisory control and data acquisition 
(SCADA) systems that poll field sensors once per several seconds synchrophasor systems 
allow measurement of up to 120 samples per second. Synchrophasor systems provide 
measurements such as voltage, current, and frequency. Synchrophasor data was used in 
this work for two reasons. First, the mining common path algorithm uses a set of system 
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states in temporal order as a signature for each observed event type. High frequency 
synchrophasor measurements enable identification of fast moving power system events. 
Some power system events involve very fast changing behaviors and may last only a few 
milliseconds [61]. For example, zone 1 faults are typically set to be cleared instantly. The 
presence of a fault and system response of opening the breaker to clear the fault take just 
a few cycles. These events can be missed by slower speed measurement systems. Second, 
synchrophasor systems provide more accurate system state visibility due to the use of 
time synchronized measurements. The mining common paths algorithm can leverage this 
improved visibility to track events related to a single event from multiple synchronized 
sensors. The high measurement frequency and time-synchronized characteristic offered 
by synchrophasor systems create very large volumes of data and enable various 
applications including Wide Area Monitoring Systems (WAMS), Wide Area Protection 
Schemes (WAPS), and System Integrity Protection Schemes (SIPS) [12][13][11]. 
However, using synchrophasor data alone is not enough to detect cyber-attacks. Such 
example can be a cyber-attack that mimics a real fault by first injecting false 
measurements then tripping the relay. The status of other power system components such 
as relays and breakers is also available as time-synchronized data via synchrophasor 
systems [11]. Combining synchrophasor data with other system logs such as relay status 
log and network event monitor logs can extend the situational awareness capabilities 
provided by a synchrophasor system to detect cyber-attacks. But, this creates the 
challenge of how heterogeneous data sources can be merged to train and use such a 
classifier. This work provides a solution to this problem by proposing a data mining 
approach that leverages the time-stamped data to extract temporal patterns which can be 
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used to describe system behavior related to disturbances, control actions, and cyber-
attacks. Henceforth,   disturbances, control actions, and cyber-attacks are collectively 
referred to as scenarios.  
In this work, a pattern for a scenario is presented as a common path that consists 
of a sequence of system states in temporal order. A system state in a common path is 
made up of multiple instantanious readings from available sensors from the system. One 
advantage of the common path is that it overcomes the difficulty in analyzing time 
domain waveforms by discovering the critical system states across very short time 
intervals (in milliseconds). These common paths are mapped into a state machine with 
two-dimensional coordinates for the scenario classification. The automatic process of 
discovering common paths is introduced by using a case study in a simulated 3-bus 2-line 
transmission system. For this work, a case study is provided which considers disturbances 
including symmetric and unsymmetric faults and different cyber-attacks that mimic the 
1LG fault to confuse operators in the control center. The cyber-attacks studied in this 
work belong to masquerading and/or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that target 
physical devices such as PMU and relays. These attacks may originate from a 
compromised node in control center, sending control commands or measurement packets 
covered by legitimate source IP addresses and legal packet formats. As such, it is 
assumeed the masquerading packets cannot be detected by traditional network intrusion 
detection systems. Validation of the mining common paths algorithm is based on 
simulated data because actual synchrophasor data is not available for researchers due to 
the proprietary nature of data, confidentiality issues, and lack of proper sharing 
mechanism among researchers and institutes. Additionally, data sets captured from 
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utilities contain a limited number of scenarios. This limits diversity in the data set. Some 
power system scenarios are rare, especially cyber-atacks, hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) 
simulation allows targeted dataset creation realistic scenarios captured from the same 
commercial devices found in utilities. The same data sets used in this work has also been 
used in [28] for synchrophasor data mining research. 
This work has three primary contributions. First, this work demonstrates a new 
classifier capable of distinguishing power system disturbances and cyber security attacks 
that interrupt power system control actions and mimic real disturbances. Second, we use 
the sequential pattern mining algorithm to mine fused heterogeneous data and create 
common paths for each known scenario. Third, power systems are dynamic in nature 
which leads to minor variations in system state for known scenarios. The classifier 
presented in this work learns by parsing datasets marked with scenario type. The training 
process results in an ordered sequence of system states, i.e. a path, representing each 
unique instance of a scenario found in the dataset. To avoid overfitting the mining 
common path algorithm was developed to discover critical states shared by similar paths 
representing the same scenario.  The result of the common path agorithm is a merged set 
of paths representing all scenarios in the dataset. The classifier matches monitored state 
transition patterns to common paths of known scenarios to provide a specific 
classification of the observed behavior.  
The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the 
methodology, the process of mining common paths, and the classifier training and 
validation phases. Section 4.3 introduces the case study test bed, test data, and test data 
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preprocessing procedure.  Section 4.4 presents the classification results of three 
experiments. Section 4.5 concludes this work and proposes future work.  
4.2 Mining common path 
4.2.1 Sequential events for a power system scenario 
 
Figure 4.1 Ideal vs. actual SLG fault and protection system response 
 
Power system scenarios can be described as an ordered sequence of measureable 
events. For example, Figure 4.1 depicts phase a current magnitude during a single-line-
to-ground (1LG) fault on a transmission line. The current magnitude can be quantized 
into 3 ranges; high, normal, and low which are represented by dark grey, white, and light 
grey shading on Figure 4.1. When the system is in a stable state, the current stays in the 
normal range, marked as node A in Figure 4.1. When the 1LG fault occurs, current 
increases to the high range via node B. The protection scheme will operate two relays, R1 
and R2, at the both ends of the transmission line to open breakers and isolate the fault.  






















to denote six events: “IR1=H” as node “B”, meaning “Current measured by R1 increases 
to High”; “IR2=H” for “Current measured by R2 increases to High”; “R1=Trip” for 
“Relay R1 trips”; “R2=Trip” for “Relay R2 trips”; “IR1=0” as node “C” for “Current 
measured by R1 drops to Zero”; “IR1=0” for “Current measured by R2 drops to Zero”. 
The timestamps of 1LG fault and resulting protection scheme operation can be 
represented by expression (1) where t(∙) stands for the timestamp of corresponding 
events.   
            02021 121 
 RITripRTripRHIHI tttttt RRR    (4.1) 
Expression (1) assumes a fault which appears at both relays at the same time and 
assumes both relays operate at the same time.  In fact, the fault may occur at different 
locations along the line leading to variations in the time each relay observes the fault and 
variations in relay operation time.  Power systems are dynamic. In Figure 4.1, the dashed 
line shows an ideal waveform of current magnitude during a fault and the solid line 
graphs a waveform captured from Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS) simulation of a 
1LG fault. The actual waveform includes multiple variations from the ideal waveform. A 
power system’s response to load variation, fault location variation, and transient 
behaviors results in irregular waveforms. Such variations are reflected as dispersions in 
the timestamps of node B and node C for different instances of the same scenario. The 
dispersion in timestamps can be seen not only in the events related to the current 
magnitude but also events related to other features. Figure 4.2 shows box plots of 
timestamps of six events for three fault scenarios and one scenario where relays R1 and 
R2 are tripped by attackers. The Figure 4.2 x-axis is the set of observed events. The box 
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plots represent 40 instances of each scenario. To provide an ordered sequence the time 
stamp of the first event in a sequence was subtracted from timestamps of all later events 
in the sequence. The box plots and the interconnecting edges of a scenario are depicted 
using the same color. As shown in Figure 4.2, events take place in temporal order. Event 
timestamps vary due to system dynamics. For each scenario, a track can be drawn by 
connecting box plot medians.  The tracks shown in Figure 4.2 generally agree with 
expression 1. Expert knowledge can be used to create similar expressions for all known 
system behaviors.  However, time variation prevents these from serving as signatures for 
classification. This leads to the need for a graph to describe an ordered set of events 
describing a scenario while comprehending the variation in times stamps.  
 
Figure 4.2 Distribution of timestamps for events 
 
Tracks are an ordered list of events with measurements where each vertice is an 
event measured at a single sensor.  The classifier presented in this work uses paths which 
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are an ordered list of system states where a state is snapshot of measurements from all 
available sensors at a given time instant. The steps taken to convert heterogeneous data 
collected during a scenario into a path will be introduced in next section. Path vertices are 
states and path edges are transitions between states. Paths are a means for providing 
stateful monitoring of the system. The training process performed to create paths is 
subject to over-fitting due to the time variations seen in Figure 4.2. In the over-fitting 
case, different instances of the same scenario may have different paths. A technique for 
mining common paths is provided below to identify shared critical states between a set of 
paths for a scenario leaving a common path which comprehends the variation in 
timestamps. 
4.2.2 Mining common paths algorithm 
Describing the Mining Common Paths algorithm requires definitions of the 
concepts of state, feature, sequence, and path.  
A state is used to represent a system’s instantaneous status. A state consists of a 
set of observed system measurements or features f as well as a normalized time stamp 
TS, i.e. S = {TS, f1,⋯,fn}. The value of a feature is read from a sensor. The possible 
values for a feature are in a range called its domain. A feature that has continuous values 
in its domain should be discretized to finite ranges to avoid an infinite state space.  
A path P is a list of observed system states arranged in temporal order according 
to their timestamps, namely Pi = {S1, S2, …, Sn}, ordered by increasing time. A sequence 
s is a subset of a path, i.e. s ⊆ P. We denote a sequence s by {Si+1, Si+2, …, Si+m}. A path 
P contains sequence s if all of the elements in s appear in P in the same order. In a set of 
sequences, a sequence is maximal if the sequence is not contained in any other sequences.  
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Let G be the set of all observed paths for a scenario Q so G = {P1, P2,…,Pn} 
where n is the number of observed paths for Q. A path supports sequence s if the 
sequence is contained in the path. Support can be defined as a metric in which the support 
of sequence s is the percentage of paths in G that contain sequence s.  
A common path for scenario Q is any sequence whose support is greater than a 
minimum support threshold and is maximal. There may be multiple common paths for a 
single scenario. Common paths reflect the states that occur most frequently for a 
scenario. The process of mining common path is similar to mining frequent sequence 
patterns as defined in [31]. 
Table 4.1 Example paths for a scenario 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6  
P1 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5  Ideal Case 
P2 S1  S2 S3 S4 S5 Delayed States 
P3 S1 S10 S2 S3 S4 S5 Extra States 
P4 S1 S11 S3 S4 S5  Modified States 
P5 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25  Error Path 
 
Example Consider the set of paths shown in Table 1. For the example G = 
{P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}. If the minimum support threshold is set to 60%, the set of 
sequences in G which meet the minimum support threshold includes {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} 
and {S1, S3, S4, S5}.  For this example, {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} is maximal and is therefore the 
common path. The sequence {S1, S3, S4, S5} is not maximal because it is contained in 
{S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}.  If the minimum support threshold is changed to 70%, the set of 
 
83 
sequences in G which meet the minimum support threshold includes only {S1, S3, S4, S5}. 
Since only one sequence meets the threshold it is maximal and is a common path. 
Table 4.1 also provides examples of types of paths. P1 represents the ideal case 
for a path representing a scenario. P2 matches P1 except a subset of states are delayed. 
This may occur due to timestamp variation of events or due to system dynamics. P3 
contains an extra state. Dynamics may occur when a feature oscillates during a state 
transition.  P4 represents the case when a path is similar but a state is different from the 
ideal case. This could happen when an event in a state (i.e. S2) does not occur due to the 
variation in the timestamp, which results in a different state (i.e. S11). P5 represents an 
error path. In the error path no sequences match the ultimate common path.  
The common path is used as a signature during classification. Changing the 
minimum support threshold changes the number of states in a common path and can 
affect classification accuracy.  It is not necessary to find a common path which matches 
the ideal path, rather the goal is to find a common path which is unique for a scenario and 
which leads to maximum classification accuracy. For a noisy system a shorter common 
path may yield better classification results. 
The common path must contain critical states about a group of paths, G. For 
example, a common path for a 1LG fault should have a sequence of critical states 
representing “current going high”, “relay trip” and “current falling to zero.” The ability to 
find a common path is greatly dependent on the “quality” of paths in G.  For example; if 
there are a many error paths in G it will be difficult to find sequences which meet the 
minimum support threshold.  
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The rest of this work presents a case study which applies the mining common path 
algorithm to a 3-bus 2-line transmission system for classifying four types of power 
system symmetric and unsymmetrical faults and three cyber-attacks scenarios. 
4.3 Power system test bed 
A real world power system is dynamic and consists of thousands of buses, loads, 
transmission lines, and other components. The power system operation goes through 
various states and is a continuous process. The 3-bus 2-line transmission system used in 
this work is modified from the IEEE 9-bus 3-generator system [62] according to our 
simulation requirements. Although this system is relatively small it captures the essence 
of the larger power system and is small enough to be comprehensible in every detail. This 
system uses commercial PMU and relays from different major vendors. The test bed and 
data sets exhibit behaviors of a real power system, yet fit into the resources available in 
the lab in terms of hardware and software limitations. The transmission system used for 
HIL simulation for this work is shown in Figure 4.3. 
4.3.1 Power system scenarios 
The power system disturbances and three types of attacks simulated for this work 
are described as follows. 
4.3.1.1 Power System Faults 
In this work we consider symmetric and unsymmetrical faults in a power system 
as the examples of disturbances. A power system fault is a condition where the system 
voltage, current and frequency are abnormal. Typically, single line to ground (1LG) 
faults, double lines to ground (2LG) faults, three lines to ground (3LG) faults and line to 
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line (LL) faults represent greater than 95% of faults in a power system [63]. In this work, 
for proof of concept we simulated phase-a-to-ground fault for 1LG faults, phase-a-b-to-
ground faults for 2LG faults, phase a-b-c-to-ground fault for (3LG) faults, and phase-a-
to-b line to line fault for LL faults. 
4.3.1.2 Trip command injection attack 
Trip command injection attacks create contingencies by remotely sending 
unexpected relay trip commands from an attacker’s computer to relays at the ends of a 
transmission line. The trip command injection attack used for this work closely mimics 
the 1LG fault. The attack was implemented against relay R1 and R2 by replaying relay 
trip commands captured from MODBUS/TCP network traffic. However, we assume 
these commands are sent from a compromised legitimate computer such that these 
commands cannot be detected by network event monitor (e.g. Snort) as attacks since they 
are from a valid source and have valid formats. The two relay trip commands open the 
breakers at the ends of transmission line L1. This attack stresses the system by forcing L2 
to carry more power flow which may cause cascading failures in a power system. 
However, for this work, cascading failures were not simulated. The trip command 
injection attack instances were created under random load conditions in the same range 
used for faults. 
4.3.1.3 Aurora attack 
The Aurora vulnerability refers to potential harm caused to a generator by 
intentionally opening and closing a breaker near the generator in rapid succession [71]. In 
this work, an aurora cyber-attack was simulated which periodically sends opening-
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closing commands to relays that cause the breaker on the transmission line to open and 
close at a very fast pace. 
4.3.1.4 1LG fault replay attack 
The 1LG fault replay attack attempts to emulate a valid fault by altering system 
measurements to mimic a 1LG fault followed by sending an illicit trip command from a 
compromised computer to relays at the ends of the transmission line. This attack may 
lead to confusion and potentially cause an operator to take invalid control actions. A 
Python script is used to initiate a Man-in-the-middle attack between the hardware PDC 
and the historian that replays synchrophasor measurements from a valid 1LG fault then 
replays commands to trip the relays on the affected line. 
4.3.2 Test bed architecture 
 
Figure 4.3 3-bus 2-line transmission system for case study 




























Figure 4.4 Hardware in the loop test bed 
 
The HIL test bed shown in Figure 4.4 was used to simulate the distance protection 
scheme on the 3-bus 2-line transmission system and implement the faults and cyber-
attacks scenarios. The RTDS was used to simulate transmission lines, breakers, 
generators, and load. Four physical relays were wired to the RTDS in a HIL 
configuration. The relays implemented a two-zone distance protection scheme. The relays 
trip and open the breakers once a fault occurs on a transmission line. Fault logic for 
different types of faults were created in RSCAD then the faults were implemented in the 
RTDS. Prior to each implementation of a fault, the system load was randomized in the 
range of 200-399MW. Each fault instance was implemented at a random location in 1% 
increments from 10% to 90% of line L1. 
The relays used in this work are the GE-D60 and SEL-421. Both are digital relays 
with integrated PMU functionality. However, PMUs and relays were drawn separately in 
Figure 4.4. The PMUs stream real-time synchrophasor measurement data, using the IEEE 
C37.118 protocol at a rate of 120 samples per second, to the PDC. Then aggregated 
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synchrophasor data is forwarded to the OpenPDC software. A python script processes the 
synchrophasor measurement data received by OpenPDC into a comma separated values 
format (CSV) file for each instance of a scenario. A row in the CSV file includes 
readings of frequency, current phasors, voltage phasors, and sequence components from 
the four PMUs, and a timestamp. Each CSV file is labeled with the instance number, 
scenario name, as well as load ranges and/or fault location at the moment the instance of 
the scenario occurs. The label is useful for grouping instances as will be discussed in 
Section 4.4. The label is also used for training and classifier testing. The four relays were 
sources of time stamped relay state changes. There is also a network event monitor that 
logs any trip command packets sending to relays. All logs and synchrophasor 
measurement CSV files were stored in a historian. The details of this test bed can be 
found in [81] [82]. 
For this work, simulation of all scenarios starts from a stable state and ends at a 
stable state. Faults last for one second and the relay closes the breaker 2 seconds after 
opening.  Also, the distance protection scheme was simplified by disabling reverse time 
delay backup and limiting the number of protection zones for each relay to 2. Each relay 
provides primary protection up to 80% of the line (Zone 1 protection) and backup 
protection (Zone 2 protection) up to 150% of the line. The trip time for Zone 1 protection 
is set to instantaneous while the trip time for the Zone 2 protection is set to 20 cycles. 
4.3.3 Test Data and Data Preprocessing 
In total 1,023 instances of 1LG faults, 274 instances of 2LG faults, 584 instances 
of 3LG faults, 272 instances of LL faults, 274 instances of command injection attacks, 
225 instances of aurora attack, and 703 instances of 1LG fault replay attack were 
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simulated. Test data consists of the synchrophasor measurement CSV files, the four relay 
logs and network event monitor logs collected during all of these scenarios. One relay log 
is extracted from one of the relays, containing timestamp and corresponding events (trip 
or not trip). Network event monitor log contains timestamp and corresponding network 
events (trip command seen or not seen). Each CSV file contains tuples with 52 
synchrophasor measurements as each PMU provides 13 measurements including voltage 
and current phasor magnitude (Va, Vb, Vc and Ia, Ib, Ic), zero, positive and negative 
sequence voltage and current phasor magnitude (V0, V1, V2 and I0, I1, I2) and apparent line 
impedance (Z). A single CSV file has approximately 2,000 tuples for an instance of a 
single scenario. Since the PMU stream at 120 samples per second, 2,000 tuples 
corresponds to 17 seconds of simulated system time per scenario. The test data was 
separated into training and testing data sets, each of which was the input to training and 
testing phases of the classifier described in the previous section. The data preprocessing 
step in the training and testing phases converts a data set into paths. This preprocessing 
process constitutes following steps. 
Step 1: Feature selection. Rather than using all recorded input features from the 
dataset, only a portion of measurements was retained as selected features. In this work, 
the selected features contain relay status and the three phases current magnitudes (Ia, Ib, 
Ic). Relay status was used as features because all cyber-attacks studied in this work 
maliciously trip relays via the network. The network event monitor log was selected as 
one of the features for the same reason. The three phase current magnitudes were selected 
because the current magnitudes of the three phases were the most significant 
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measurements during symmetric and unsymmetrical faults. Other unselected 
measurements were discarded from the input data.  
Step 2: Quantizing features. Each feature was first quantized into finite ranges. 
The quantization of features requires an expert’s domain knowledge. Continuous features 
such as phase current for this case study were quantized into nominal ranges to create a 
finite state space. The phase currents were quantized into low, normal, and high ranges. 
The low range was 0-99 Amperes (A). The normal range was 100-1199 A. The high 
range was greater than 1200 A. The relay status was quantized into two values; tripped 
and not tripped. The network event monitor log was also quantized into two values; trip 
command seen and trip command not seen. 
Step 3: Merge quantized features into a measured events database.  The 
measurement data from the PMU and relay log were merged into a single measured 
events database for one instance of a scenario. The PMU current magnitude 
measurements were measured at 120 samples per second while relay status was updated 
only on a relay state change. To merge the features phase current was chosen as a 
reference and the relay status was up sampled prior to merging into the measured events 
database. 
The aggregated features with their quantized values in a single row of the 
measured events database describe the system state at a given timestamp. A system state 
thus is a vector of timestamps and features with quantized measurements. An example of 
such state that describes relay R1 and R2 tripping due to high current magnitude can be 
represented as a vector {Timestamp, IR1 = High, IR2 = High, R1 = Trip, R2 = Trip, …}, 
where “IR1 = High” and “IR2 = High” in the vector represent high current magnitudes 
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measured by PMUs in R1 and R2. “R1 = Trip” and “R2 = Trip” in the vector represent 
relay trip status of the two relays. Note that there will be other features with quantized 
values in the vector but they are not displayed in this example. The time difference 
between two states is same as that between two rows in the measured events database, 
which is the reciprocal of the synchrophasor measurement rate; 1/120 samples per second 
= 8.33 milliseconds (ms). The timestamps of rows in the measured events database are 
normalized by subtracting the time of the first row from all other rows. This causes all 
measured events databases to start from time 0. 
Step 4: Mining paths from measured events databases. A path is mined from a 
measured events database by first merging contiguous rows with unchanged state in the 
measured events database. The remaining rows contain unique states. A state space 
database is used to track the unique states. Each unique state is given a state identifier 
(Sid). Rows are updated to include the state identifier of the system state with the time 
stamp of the state. 
Paths are an ordered list of states. Each instance of a scenario will have a path. 
Many instances of a scenario will have unique paths due to system and measurement 
dynamics. The paths mined from training data sets over fit the actual system behavior 
they are intended to model. If raw paths are used for classification the classifier accuracy 
will be low. Common paths are needed which represent the scenario across all variations 
found in the training data set. 
4.4 Evaluation 
Three experiments were performed to validate the Mining Common Paths 
algorithm. The first experiment classifies two classes, 1LG fault and command injection 
 
92 
attack. To further stress the algorithm, we design the second experiment which performs 
classification on different 1LG fault locations classes and command injection attack class. 
The second experiment uses the same training data set and testing data set as experiment 
1, but it requires an extra step in training in which system expertise is used to divide the 
1LG fault class into multiple subclasses representing different fault locations. In 
experiment 3, we tested the algorithm for 4 types of short-circuit faults and 3 types of 
attacks. Experiment 3 uses 10-round cross validation to validate the correctness of the 
classifier. Experiment 3 also includes a comparison of classification accuracy using 
different PMU streaming rates.  The training phase and test phase used for each 
experiment are summarized as follows. 
4.4.1 Training phase: 
Input: Training data set for NTraining instances of M classes (each class associates with 
one scenario) 
Output: M sets of common paths (cp) for M classes 
Step 1: Training data set is preprocessed into NTraining paths as stated in Section IV.C for 
NTraining instances. 
Step 2: NTraining paths are grouped into M groups for M classes. 
Step 3: Common paths are computed for each group of paths. 
4.4.2 Test phase: 
Input: Test data set for NTest instances of M classes 
Output: Classify instance by scenario type 
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Step 1: For each instance in test data set, preprocess instance into one path under test 
(PUTj). 
Step 2: Compare the path to all common paths in cp by repeating Step 3 for each cpi in 
cp. 
Step 3: If cpi ⊆ PUTj then cpi is a candidate common path. 
Step 4: The PUTi is classified as class of the maximal length candidate common path. If 
more than one maximal candidate common path are maximal then PUTi is classified as 
unknown. 
Step 5: If PUTi is classified as none of the known classes, then it is marked as unknown. 
Step 6: Repeat Step 1 to Step 5 for all NTesting instances. 
4.4.3 Experiment 1 
For the first experiment, approximately half of the test data for 1LG fault and 
command injection attack is randomly chosen as training data set while the rest is used as 
a testing data set. This resulted in 519 instances of 1LG fault and 127 instances of the 
command injection attack which were used for training. Table 4.2 is a confusion matrix 
for experiment 1. 
For this work, accuracy, misclassification, and unknown rates were defined as 
follows. The accuracy rate is the percentage of instances correctly classified. 
Misclassification rate is the percentage of the instances of a class which were 
misclassified as another scenario. The unknown rate is percentage of the instances of a 
scenario which were not classified as any scenario. Unknown instances either match no 




Table 4.2 Confusion matrix for experiment 1 
 Fault C. Inj. 
Fault 491 0 
C. Inj. 0 123 
Unknown 28 4 
 
For the first experiment, the overall classification accuracy was 95%. No 
instances were misclassified. A total of 5% of tested scenario instances were unknown. 
All unknown instances matched at least one fault and at least one command injection 
common path.  
There were a total of 221 common paths found for the two scenarios; 203 for 1LG 
fault scenario and 18 for the command injection scenario. This high number of paths 
results from the dynamic nature of the power system. Figure 4.5 is a plot of the fault 
location, from the perspective of relay R1, versus relay trip times for relays R1 and R2.  
Figure 4.5 clearly shows zone 1 and zone 2 trip boundaries for both relays. Additionally, 
Figure 4.5 shows that the relay trip times vary with fault location especially in the fault 
location region from 24-79% of the transmission line. The large number of common 
paths for the 1LG fault injection scenario is primarily due to this variation. System 
behavior also varies as the system load changes.  Behavior changes due to system lead to 





















Figure 4.5 Relay trip time versus fault location for relays R1 and R2 
 
4.4.4 Experiment 2 
Ideally, faults between 0-20% of the transmission line should have instant trip 
time for relay R1 and trip after 20 cycles for relay R2. Faults between 80-100% of the 
transmission line should trip after 20 cycles for relay R1 and instantly for relay R2. In the 
21-79% range both relays should ideally trip instantly.  Observed trip times match the 
ideal case for the 0-20% and 80-100% ranges. Note, the apparent impedance setting for 
zone 2 for relay R2 causes the zone 1 to zone 2 transition to occur at approximately 23% 
of the line (77% of the line from relay R2’s perspective) instead of at the expected 20% 
of the line (80% of the line from relay R2’s perspective). 
The trip times from 24-80% of the line are always instantaneous. Observed trip 
times tended to increase as the fault approached the zone 1 to zone 2 boundary points.  To 
compensate for this observed behavior the 1LG fault paths were grouped by fault location 
per the following groups; (10-23%, 24-29%, 30-35%, 36-40%, 41-60%, 61-65%, 66-
70%, 71-80%, 81-90%).   Additionally, it was observed that trip times partially correlated 
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to the system load. As a result, the 1LG fault class used in experiment 1 is divided into 
multiple classes by fault location and load. Four load ranges were used; (200-249, 250-
399, 300-349, 350-399 MW).  This subdivided the 1LG fault class into 9*4 = 36 sub 
classes. 
The command injection attack class in experiment 1 was also divided using 4 load 
ranges, which results in 4 command injection attack classes.  
The extra step of subdividing the 1LG fault class and command injection attack 
results in a total of 40 classes, i.e. M = 40 in the training phase of the classifier. The 
training data set and testing data set in this experiment is the same as that used in 
experiment 1. 
Table 4.3 Confusion matrix for experiment 2 



















10-23% 191 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23-29% 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30-35% 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36-40% 0 7 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 0 
41-60% 0 0 0 2 41 2 0 0 0 0 
61-65% 0 0 0 0 5 10 0 0 0 0 
65-70% 0 0 0 0 8 3 14 4 0 0 
71-80% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 38 18 0 
81-90% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 135 0 
C. Inj. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 127 
Unk. Fault 0 0 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unknown 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 4.3 is a confusion matrix for all scenarios for experiment 2. As previously 
mentioned, the 1LG fault classes were divided by fault location and system load. To save 
space the groups in the confusion matrix were combined to just show the fault location 
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classes and one command injection class. An extra row (marked Unk. for unknown) was 
added to the confusion matrix to show instances of scenarios which were not classified.  
The experiment 2 classification accuracy, misclassification, and unknown rates 
can be viewed from multiple perspectives. The overall accuracy rate for the groups 
shown in the confusion matrix was 87.6%. Misclassification and unknown rates for the 
same groups were 9.1% and 3.3% respectively. From the confusion matrix the majority 
of misclassification occurred when 1LG fault groups were classified as members of a 
neighboring or nearby fault group. The unknown cases are separated into unknown 
instances which resulted from an instance matching multiple fault common paths (“Unk. 
Fault” in Table 4.3) and unknown instances which matched no common path. The 16 
cases of faults which matched common paths from more than one group all occurred 
because both the (30-35%) and (36-40%) shared a common path. 
The intent of subdividing the  1LG fault class was not to classify 1LG faults by a 
specific fault location. Correctly classifying a fault as a fault is sufficient as many 
algorithms are available to provide fault location information. The accuracy rate when the 
fault location classes were combined into a single class is 96.7%. The misclassification 
rate was 0% and the unknown rate was 3.3%. 
Common paths can be mapped into two-dimensional coordinates with the Y-axis 
indicating the state identification code (state ID) and the X-axis indicating normalized 
timestamps. An edge between two vertices represents the temporal transition between 
two states. Each vertex is marked with state information.  shows common paths for two 
scenarios, a fault in the 36-40% fault location group and a command injection attack.  
The fault and command injection common paths both start at the system normal state. 
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These paths differ immediately because for faults the PMU will measure high current 
when a fault is present. This makes the second state of the fault common path high 
current detected at relay R1. The command injection attack occurs when there is no fault 
present. As such, the second state for the command injection attack has normal current at 
both relays while both relay’s status indicates a trip. 
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Figure 4.7 2-D coordinates comparing two common paths for faults 
 
Figure 4.6 shows common paths for two different 1LG fault locations. Note that 
not all features are displayed in the graph. The 10-23% fault is in relay R2 zone 2 and the 
24-29% fault is in relay R2 zone 1. This difference is the primary reason for different 
paths for the two fault sub groups. 
 Figure 4.7 demonstrate that common paths contain the critical states for different 
scenarios. The primary contribution of the mining common paths algorithm is the ability 
to create unique paths for each scenario type. 
Training and testing processing time and memory usage were measured using an 
Ubuntu Linux Virtual Machine with 3.5GHZ CPU and 2GB memory. For experiment 1, 
training required 202 seconds and 25.3 MB memory. Experiment 1 testing required 550 
seconds to complete and 25.3 MB of memory. For experiment 2, training required 205 
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seconds and 25.2 megabytes (MB) memory. Experiment 2 testing required 540 seconds 
to complete and 25.2 MB of memory. 
4.4.5 Experiment 3 
A third experiment was conducted for classifying 4 types of symmetric and 
unsymmetrical faults and 3 types of cyber-attacks. The training phase used the same 
methodology as experiments 1 and 2. Validation in this experiment used10-round cross 
validation. In each round, half of the test data was randomly chosen as a training dataset 
and the remaining data was used as the testing data set. Table 4.4 is a combined 
confusion matrix for 10 rounds of validation for the 1LG, 2LG, 3LG, LL faults, 
command injection, Aurora, and fault replay attacks. Each entry in the table sums up 
numbers for 10 rounds in the corresponding location. 
 
Table 4.4 Confusion Matrix for 4 types of faults and 3 cyber-attacks 














1LG Flt. 5009 0 0 3 0 0 109 
2LG Flt. 6 1248 0 0 0 0 0 
3LG Flt. 86 11 2905 24 0 0 17 
LL Flt. 0 14 0 1089 0 0 0 
Cmd. Inj. 0 0 0 6 1380 0 124 
Aurora 0 0 0 0 0 971 0 
Flt. Replay 0 0 0 0 0 0 3138 
Unknown 177 58 15 238 0 159 97 
 
The total number of classifications made in Table 4 is 16,851, of which 15,740 
instances are correctly classified. The average accuracy for the seven classes shown in 
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Table 4 is 93.41%. Only 488 instances of faults (177 of 1LG fault, 58 of 2LG fault, and 
15 of 3LG fault and 238 for LL) were classified as unknown. And only 6 instances of 
faults are misclassified as cyber-attacks. The lowest accuracy for an individual class or 
scenario type was for fault replay attacks. Fault replay attack classification accuracy was 
90%. Fault replay attacks were misclassified as a fault for 3.6% of the tested instances 
and misclassified as a command injection attack for 3.5% of tested instances. The fault 
replay attack is intended to mimic a 1LG fault and as such is sometimes able to confuse 
the classifier. The fault replay includes elements from the command injection attack. This 
leads to similarities which cause occasional misclassification as a command injection 
attack. Table 4 demonstrates that the classifier is able to distinguish faults and cyber-
attacks.  
The accuracy rate for 10-round validation when the PMU is sample rate at 20, 30, 
60, and 120 Hertz (Hz) is plotted in Figure 4.8. Classification accuracy is higher when the 
PMU is streaming at 120 Hz and lowest at 20 Hz. This is reasonable as higher PMU 
samples rates gives better visibility of the system states when fast moving events, such as 
faults, are considered. 
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The mining common paths algorithm creates common paths from heterogenerous 
data in the power system. A common path represents a set of critical states that a system 
will step through in temporal order for a scenario such as a disturbance or a cyber-attack. 
Common paths can be used as signatures to classify power system behaviors with high 
specificity. Such a classifier is a useful tool for use with automated system integrity 
protection systems and wide area control systems which include responses for both 
natural, equipment failure, and cyber-attack related contingiencies.   
Simple paths can be derived from monitored instances of sceanrios applied to a 
test bed. However, the transients present in time-domain measurement data lead to 
different paths for different instances of the same scenario. The mining common paths 
algorithm uses a sequential pattern mining approach to overcome this challenge and 
common paths for the scenario.  
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To validate the correctness of the algorithm, a case study was performed which 
applied the mining common paths algorithm and classifier to detect disturbances and 
cyber-attacks. The classifier provides a capability to accurately distinguish between 
different types of power system faults  and cyber-attacks including command injection, 
aurora attacks and fault replay attacks.  Three separate experiments were performed. The 
first experiment applied the mining common paths algorithm to data with 2 classes; 1LG 
fault and command injection. The second experiment adds an extra step prior to the 
training phase where the 1LG fault class is divided into a number of subclasses by taking 
advanatage of power system domain expertise. The extra step of sub-dividing classes in 
training produces slightly better accuracy, misclassification, and unknown classification. 
Both experiments required similar training time, testing time, and memory usage. A third 
experiment was conducted using the same training as experiment 2. Ten round cross 
validation was performed with varying PMU sample rates.  The ten round validation 
shows the classifier has not overfit the data.  Comparison of varying PMU sample rates 
shows the highest accuracy is achieved with PMU sampled in 120 Hz. This is expected 
since faults are fast moving events and 120 Hz sample rate provides the most visibility of 
system state changes. 
This work demonstrates a methodology to leverage synchrophasor measurements 
for power system disturbance and cyber-attack detecion and highlights the promise of the 




DEVELOPING A HYBRID INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM USING DATA 
MINING FOR POWER SYSTEM 
5.1 Introduction 
The next generation power system, also known as smart grid, will rely on 
advanced technologies such as synchrophasor systems for wide area monitoring and 
control in order to meet the increasing demand of reliable energy. While in the past, 
power system components were isolated, they are now interconnected via information 
infrastructure e.g. Ethernet, and therefore are under the threat of cyber-attacks. Due to the 
critical role that the power system plays in our society, there is a common agreement that 
the electric power grid needs to be better secured to ensure continually available power 
for the nation [1]. There have been multiple documents from different organizations 
which provide recommendations and guidelines for industry to better secure their 
facilities[2][3]. However, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
has realized that current guidelines are not sufficient to securely implement the smart grid 
and calls for research and development to improve upon current security mechanisms [4]. 
Intrusion detection is a process which identifies activities that violate the security 
policy in a computer system or network. Intrusion detection is a necessary complement to 
preventive mechanisms such as firewalls because intrusion detection has the ability to 
detect attacks that exploit system design flaws or bugs and to help people understand the 
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cause of attacks and thus take proper reactions [7]. The increasing coupling of cyber 
infrastructure and physical devices of the smart grid makes a traditional host-based 
intrusion detection system (IDS) inadequate because host-based IDS only monitor one 
location or one host in the system while power system control algorithms such as the 
distance protection scheme usually involve multiple devices at multiple locations. 
Therefore, new IDS should have the ability to take multiple data sources into account and 
perform stateful monitoring at the system level. Manually building a stateful system level 
IDS is a knowledge-intensive task which requires vulnerability analysis and manual 
creation of rules and patterns which describe attacks, system specification, or system 
normal behaviors. The manual development process results in limited scalability and 
updates are slow and expensive.  
This chapter documents a systematic and automated approach to building a hybrid 
IDS that leverages features of signature-based and specification-based IDS. The IDS 
classifies system behaviors over time as specific disturbances, normal control operations, 
and cyber-attacks. Sequence of critical states, called common path, provide a 
specification or signature for each scenario. A fundamental ingredient of the IDS 
presented in this chapter is a data mining technique that aggregates synchrophasor 
measurement data and audit logs from multiple system devices to learn the common 
paths. The automatic approach eliminates the need to manually analyze and hand-code 
patterns and is able to handle very large amounts of data. A case study is included to 
demonstrate that the proposed IDS provides high detection accuracy for both known and 




Common paths are signatures of events present in a training database.  Common 
paths are also specifications since they describe expected system behaviors related to 
known scenarios; normal expected system behaviors and cyber-attacks behaviors.  The 
IDS matches a temporal set of monitored system states to common paths, a signature 
based technique, to make a classification.   Behaviors which do not match a common path 
are considered unspecified events and are either zero day attacks or unknown system 
behaviors. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The mining common path 
algorithm is reviewed in Section 5.2. The overview of the test bed and simulated power 
system scenarios are presented in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 introduces the procedures to 
construct the proposed IDS. Experiments and results are discussed in Section 5.5. 
Conclusions and future work are provided in Section 5.6. 
5.2 Mining common paths 
A state is used to represent a system’s instantaneous status. A state consists of a 
set of observed system measurements or features f as well as a normalized time stamp 
TS, i.e. S = {TS, f1,⋯,fn}. The value of a feature is read from a sensor. The possible 
values for a feature are in a range called its domain. A feature that has continuous values 
in its domain should be discretized to finite ranges to avoid an infinite state space.  
A path P is a list of observed system states arranged in temporal order according 
to their timestamps, namely Pi = {S1, S2, …, Sn}, ordered by increasing time. A sequence 
s is a subset of a path, i.e. s ⊆ P. We denote a sequence s by {Si+1, Si+2, …, Si+m}. A path 
P contains sequence s if all of the elements in s appear in P in the same order. In a set of 
sequences, a sequence is maximal if the sequence is not contained in any other sequences.  
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Let G be the set of all observed paths for a scenario Q so G = {P1, P2,…,Pn} 
where n is the number of observed paths for Q. A path supports sequence s if the 
sequence is contained in the path. Support can be defined as a metric in which the support 
of sequence s is the percentage of paths in G that contain sequence s.  
A common path for scenario Q is any sequence whose support is greater than a 
minimum support threshold and is maximal. There may be multiple common paths for a 
single scenario. Common paths reflect the states that occur most frequently for a 
scenario. The process of mining common path is similar to mining frequent sequence 
patterns as defined in [31]. 
Table 5.1 Example paths for a scenario 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6  
P1 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5  Ideal Case 
P2 S1  S2 S3 S4 S5 Delayed States 
P3 S1 S10 S2 S3 S4 S5 Extra States 
P4 S1 S11 S12 S4 S5  Modified States 
P5 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25  Error Path 
 
Example Consider the set of paths shown in Table 5.1. For the example G = 
{P1, P2, P3, P4, P5}. If the minimum support threshold is set to 60%, the set of 
sequences in G which meet the minimum support threshold includes {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}, 
{S1, S3, S4, S5} and {S1, S4, S5}.  For this example, {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5} is maximal and is 
therefore the common path. The sequences {S1, S3, S4, S5} and {S1, S4, S5} are not 
maximal because they are contained in {S1, S2, S3, S4, S5}. Alternatively, if the minimum 
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support threshold is changed to 70%, the set of sequences in G which meet the minimum 
support threshold includes only {S1, S4, S5}. Since {S1, S4, S5} meets the threshold in this 
case, it is maximal and is a common path.  
Table 5.1 also provides examples of possible types of paths that could be found in 
the dataset. P1 represents the ideal case for a path representing a scenario. P2 matches P1 
except a subset of states are delayed. This may occur due to a measurement error or due 
to power system dynamics. P3 contains an extra state. Dynamics may occur when a 
feature oscillates during a state transition.  P4 represents the case when a path is similar 
but a state is different from the ideal case. This could happen when an event that should 
have occurred at T2 occurs at T3 instead, which mangles states S2 and S3 (they change to 
S11, S12). P5 represents an error path. In the error path no sequences match the ultimate 
common path.  
The common path is used as a specification during classification. Changing the 
minimum support threshold changes the number of states in a common path and can 
affect classification accuracy.  It is not necessary to find a common path which matches 
the ideal path, rather the goal is to find a common path which is unique for a scenario and 
which leads to maximum classification accuracy. For a noisy system a shorter common 
path may yield better classification results. 
A common path for a single line to ground (SLG) fault should have a sequence of 
critical states representing “current going high”, “relay trip” and “current falling to zero.” 
The ability to find a common path is greatly dependent on the quality of paths in G.  For 
example; if there are a many error paths in G it will be difficult to find sequences which 
meet the minimum support threshold.  
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Classification is performed by comparing observed system states to the states of 
known common paths. The path under test (PUT) is compared to all common paths.  If 
cpi ⊆ PUT then cpi is a candidate common path. The PUT is classified as matching the 
scenario of the maximal candidate common path from the set of candidate common paths. 
If more than one candidate common path are maximal the PUT is classified as unknown. 
The rest of this chapter presents a case study which applies the mining common 
path algorithm to a 3-bus 2-line transmission system for classifying 25 power system 
scenarios. 
5.3 Test bed architecture 
5.3.1 Distance protection for transmission lines 
 
Figure 5.1 Distance protection scheme in a 3-bus 2-line transmission system 
 



























Figure 5.2 Electric transmission system test bed 
 
The distance protection scheme is the most popular scheme for protecting 
transmission lines. The principle of operation recognizes that the impedance of a high-
voltage transmission line is approximately proportional to its length. This means the 
impedance “seen” by the relay during a fault is proportional to the distance between the 
point of fault and the relay. Distance relays are encoded with multiple protection zones. 
Each zone is assigned an apparent impedance threshold and a trip time. Relays have over 
lapping protection zones to provide system protection redundancy. One relay’s Zone 1 is 
part of another relay’s Zone 2 and so forth. For this case study, the distance protection 
scheme was simplified by disabling reverse time delay backup and limiting the number of 
protection zones for each relay to 2. Figure 5.1 shows a 3-bus 2-line transmission system 
that is modified from IEEE 4-bus 3-generator system . Relay R1’s zones 1 and 2 are 
shown as dashed line boxes. Each relay provides primary protection up to 80% of the line 
(Zone 1 protection) and backup protection (Zone 2 protection) up to 150% of the line in 
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case that the primary protection fails. The trip time for Zone 1 protection is configured to 
be instantaneous while the trip time for the Zone 2 protection is time-delayed to avoid 
false tripping unless the primary relay fails. 
5.3.2 Test bed architecture 
The hardware-in-the-loop test bed shown in Figure 5.2 was used to simulate the 
distance protection scheme on the 3-bus 2-line transmission system and to implement 25 
power system disturbance, control action, and cyber attack scenarios. The RTDS was 
used simulate transmission lines, breakers, generators, and load. Four physical relays 
were wired to the RTDS in a hardware-in-the-loop configuration. The relays 
implemented the two zone distance protection scheme. The relays trip and open the 
breakers when a fault occurs on a transmission line. All relays included integrated PMU 
functionality to measure power system transmission line state; however, the PMU(s) were 
drawn separately in the graph because relays are controlled by Modbus/TCP and PMUs 
stream synchrophasor measurements using the IEEE C37.118 protocol. The PMU(s) 
streamed real-time synchrophasor measurement data at a rate of 120 samples per second, 
to the PDC which aggregate network frames from multiple PMU and forward the 
aggregated synchrophasor frames to the OpenPDC software. A python script processes 
the synchrophasor measurement data received by OpenPDC into a comma separated file. 
The synchrophasor measurement data includes readings of frequency, current phasors, 
voltage phasors, and sequence components. The four relays were sources of time stamped 
relay state changes. The signature-based intrusion detection system Snort runs on a PC to 
detect network activities. Snort provides alerts when it detects remote tripping command 
activities in the network. Snort, by itself, cannot distinguish between legitimate and 
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illegitimate remote trip commands since they appear the same on the network. A control 
panel computer simulates energy management system (EMS) functionality. The EMS 
simulation was used to disconnect a transmission line for maintenance by remotely 
tripping relays via a MODBUS/TCP network packet. An EMS log provides the 
timestamp of such a line maintenance event. For this work, it is assumed that an attacker 
computer has successfully penetrated the utility’s operational network and can launch 
cyber-attacks from a node on the operational network. Scenarios of power system 
disturbances, normal operations and power system cyber-attacks are applied against the 
simulated power system and its components. Data logs were captured from the 
synchrophasor system, relays, Snort, and the simulated EMS.  All data logs were time 
stamped and logged events were labeled with the name of the scenario being simulated. 
5.3.3 Test bed scenarios 
The power system scenarios used to train and validate the IDS presented in this 
chapter have been grouped into three categories; power system single-line-to-ground 
faults, normal operations, and cyber-attacks. Each category is described in this section 
with details. There are a total 25 scenarios each named with capital “Q” along with a 
number. The system load was randomized at the beginning of each scenario. Power 
system SLG faults belong to the shunt fault family and account for up to 70% of faults in 
a power system [23]. For this work, only phase-a-to-ground faults were simulated as each 
phase to ground fault has similar characteristics. The phase-a-to-ground fault is 
abbreviated as “fault” in the rest of this chapter. There are 2 SLG fault scenarios as 
named Q1 and Q2 that simulate faults on one of the two transmission lines. Each fault 
instance was implemented at a random location in 1% increments from 10% to 90% of 
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the corresponding transmission line. Faults were simulated for 1 second afterwhich an 
automatic reclosing algorithm restored the transmission line to service. 
The transmission line maintenance scenario simulates the situation when an 
operator remotely trips relays to open breakers at both ends of a transmission line to take 
the line out of service for line maintenance. The operator initiated remote trip commands 
are recorded and time stamped in the control panel log. Two scenarios of this type, Q5 
and Q6, were implemented, one for each of the two transmission lines.  
Power system cyber-attacks may originate from insiders, amateur hackers, 
political activists, criminal organizations, governments, and terrorists. Cyber-attacks may 
appear as a nuisance or may bring the system to collapse [24]. Attacks can be carried out 
from within power system substations, control center, transmission and distribution 
infrastructures by exploiting weaknesses in physical security policies. Alternatively, 
attacks may take advantage of security flaws and vulnerabilities in software, devices, 
communication infrastructures, and protocols to electronically infiltrate power system 
operational networks. Three types of attacks are simulated; relay trip command injection; 
disabling relay function; SLG fault replay. 
Relay trip command injection attacks create contingencies by sending unexpected 
relay trip commands remotely from an attacker’s computer to the relays at the ends of the 
two transmission lines. The trip command injection attack used for this work closely 
mimics the line maintenance scenario. The malicious trip command originates from 
another node on the communications network with a spoofed legitimate IP address. Since 
the attack is not from the control panel computer there will not be no record in the control 
panel log, however, the Snort network traffic monitor will detect this remote trip 
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command. There are 6 scenarios of this type of attack targeting either one relay (Q7, Q8, 
Q9, Q10), or two relays at the same time (Q11, Q12). 
The disabled relay attack mimics the effects of insiders taking illicit control 
actions or malware taking control of software systems to manipulate control devices. A 
python script accesses a relay’s internal registers via MODBUS/TCP commands sent 
from the attacker’s computer which modify the relevant relay settings. A total of 12 
scenarios of this attack are simulated in the test bed. There are 6 scenarios that disable 
one or two relays which cause the relay not to operate when a valid fault occurs (Q13, 
Q14, Q15, Q16, Q21, Q22). Another 6 scenarios disable one or two relays to interrupt 
line maintenance operation by disabling relay tripping function and causing the breakers 
not to open (Q17, Q18, Q19, Q20, Q23, Q24).  
The SLG fault replay attack attempts to emulate a valid fault by altering system 
measurements followed by sending an illicit trip command to relays at the ends of the 
transmission line. This attack may lead to confusion and potentially cause an operator to 
take invalid control actions. A Python script is used to initiate a Man-in-the-middle 
(MITM) attack between the hardware PDC and the historian computer. The attack 
replays synchrophasor measurements from a valid single line to ground fault then replays 
commands to trip the relays on the affected line. There are 2 scenarios of this type of 
attack simulating relay faults at one of the two transmission lines (Q3 and Q4). 
The final scenario, Q25, represents a stable system state. For this scenario the load 
may change, but, no other attacks, disturbances, or control actions are simulated.  
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All scenarios start and end with the system in a stable state. As such, all faults are 
cleared, transmission lines taken out of service for maintenance are returned to service, 
and all attacks end. 
5.3.4 Scenario implementation 
Figure 5.3 shows control flow between test bed components. The intention of this 
design is to simulate large numbers of scenarios in random order with random test bed 
parameters such as load level and fault locations. The AutoIT script controls different 
scripts for the implementation of different scenarios as shown in the dash line box in the 






















Figure 5.3 Control flow for automation scenario implementation and data collections 
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There are a couple of attack scripts that are developed in Python, which 
implements different cyber-attacks in the test bed. For example, the command injection 
attack script to remotely trip a relay sends a Modbus trip command to relays. The SLG 
fault replay attack script sets up a man-in-the-middle attack using Ettercap, then alters 
PMU data in flight, and finally trips the relays to imitate a legal relay trip.  
Line maintenance scenarios are also implemented using Python scripts, however, 
while sending the trip command to relays, they will also put an entry in the control panel 
log indicating the legality of this action. Single line to ground faults are simulated using a 
Matlab routine which triggers a SLG fault on target line locations in RTDS. Either line 
from Figure 5.1 will be taken out of service. 
The disabled relay attack requires coordination between different scripts. First, an 
attack script sends a “relay function OFF” command via Modbus to the target relay. 
Second, the Matlab instructs the RTDS to execute the proscribed SLG fault. This 
coordination is done by the master AutoIT script invoking the two scripts in the specified 
order. 
The master AutoIT script will call each script with randomized parameters in 
random order at random times. Randomized parameters will include the relay targets, 
system load level, and fault location where appropriate. The master script will also 
include relatively long periods of normal operation. 
With this test bed, the implementations of a large number of scenarios can be 
easily scheduled through the AutoIT script. Each implementation is also configured to 
run with random test bed parameters to simulate real world power system. The 
parameters are fed to different scripts as arguments. For example, load level and fault 
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location are two arguments to the Matlab routine, the values of which result in SLG fault 
at a specified load level and fault location. After each implementation, relay logs, control 
panel logs and synchrophasor measurement data can be collected from the output of log 
retrieving script, synchrophasor data retrieving script and control panel script. The data 
then will be marked with corresponding scenario number. 
The test bed also facilitates the implementation of new scenarios. New scenarios 
can be developed in scripts with interfaces that are callable by the master AutoIT scripts. 
5.3.5 Test data 
Test data used for this work includes data logs associated with 10,000 simulated 
instances of the 25 aforementioned scenarios. The data log is a comma separated file with 
labeled tuples that include 56 sensor measurements and a timestamp.  The 56 data 
sources consist of 52 synchrophasor measurements; 13 from each relay location on 
Figure 5.1. The synchrophasor data from a single relay consists of phase a voltage and 
current phasor magnitude (Va, Vb, Vc and Ia, Ib, Ic), zero, positive and negative sequence 
voltage and current phasor magnitude (V0, V+, V- and I0, I+, I-) and apparent line 
impedance (Z). The synchrophasor data was sampled at 120 times per second. Relay 
status information, breaker events, Snort alerts, and control panel alerts were also logged. 
All logged data was merged into a single dataset.  
An instance of a single scenario is represented by approximately 2,000 tuples in 
the test data set. This corresponds to approximately 17 seconds of simulated system time 
per scenario.  In total the test data has more than 2 million tuples. Each tuple in the test 
data is labeled. Approximately half of the test data was used to train the classifier and 
half was used to test classification accuracy.  
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For this work, 15 features were used; phase current magnitude measured at each 
relay, relay status for each relay, snort alert status for each relay, and control panel 
remote trip status. 
5.4 Training the IDS 
This section documents the IDS construction process. An overview of the IDS 
construction process is shown in Figure 5.4. The data formatting step converts input data 
logs to a measured events database (MED). Next, the specification learning steps process 
the MED to learn common paths, a unique set of system states in temporal order, for each 

























Figure 5.4 Intrusion detection system training process 
 
5.4.1 Data Formatting 
The first step of the data formatting process is feature quantization. Feature 
quantization requires domain expertise. Features with values which can take continuous 
values are mapped into finite ranges to limit state space size. Features which take discrete 
values are generally left unchanged unless the number of discrete values is large. 
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The phase current measurement is a real number and therefore should be grouped 
into discrete ranges. Phase current magnitude was separated into normal and high ranges. 
The normal range was 0-1199 Amperes (A). The high range was all values greater than or 
equal to 1200 A. The relay status, snort alert, and control panel remote trip status features 
are all binary. Possible relay status values are tripped and not tripped.  Possible Snort 
alert status values are alert and no alert. Possible control panel remote trip status values 
are tripped and not tripped.  
The MED is a merged compressed data set with quantized features. Data from 
sensors with lower sample rates is up sampled to match the sampling rate of the sensor 
with the highest sampling rate. The up sampling process depends upon the sensor type. 
Continuously sampled sensors update their value at each sample period based upon the 
current measured state. The current magnitude and relay status are continuously sampled. 
Event based sensors provide a single message when a state change occurs.  The snort 
alert and control panel remote trip status features are event based. For each, when the 
sensor detects the presence of an event the sensor provides a message indicating the event 
occurred.  In a data log a continuously sampled sensor measurement takes a value and 
holds that value across multiple samples until the state changes. Conversely, in the data 
log event based features are asserted for a single sample for each measured event. 
When up sampling, continuously sampled sensor measurements are mapped to the 
nearest sample period after the measurement.  All samples without a value take the value 
nearest proceeding sample. Event based sensor measurements are also mapped to the 
nearest sample period after the measurement. All samples without a value take the non 
asserted value. For this work, the current magnitude measurements were measured at 120 
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samples per second which is the highest sampling rate of all features. Relay status, snort 
alerts, and control panel log features were up sampled according to the aforementioned 
procedure. 
An MED represents one instance of a scenario. As such, data formatting requires 
copying each scenario into a separate file. The timestamps of rows in the MED are 
normalized by subtracting the time of the first row from all other rows. This causes all 
measured events databases to start from time 0. 
5.4.2 Creating and grouping paths 
5.4.2.1 Creating paths 
A path is a list of observed system states arranged in temporal order. Mining paths 
is performed by down sampling the MED while preserving all state transitions. A state 
change is a change on any sensor value between two MED samples. The MED is parsed 
to identify all periods of consistent state. Consistent state periods are down sampled using 
a user defined sample period. For this work, the sample period was 0.5 seconds. Each 
unique state is assigned a state identifier (Sid) and all known states are stored in a state 
data base. 
A path is mined for each MED. A single scenario will have many unique paths 
due to the dynamic nature of power systems, variations in the order of states within a 
path, and due to variations in event timing.  Using the paths derived from the mining 
paths process for classification results in poor classification accuracy.  The mining 
common paths algorithm is used to shrink the larger group of paths into a representative 



























CP = R1 SNT = R1 IR1 = 0  
Figure 5.5 Dispersion of timestamps for three states that contain three events CP = R1, 
SNT = R1 and IR1 = 0. 
 
There will be situation where a feature (or more features) used to construct MED 
has big deviation in its timestamps due to transmission delay or tight computational 
resources of a computer. This causes the paths created from the MED merging step to be 
inaccurate. We call such feature “error feature”. Figure 5.5 shows timestamps of three 
states from left to right that contain event “control panel sending trip command to relay 
R1” (CP = R1), event “snort detecting trip command to R1” (SNT = R1) and event 
“current measured by R1 dropping to zero” (IR1 = 0) respectively. The most left box plot 
shows that feature “control panel log” is an error feature because the timestamps of “CP 
= R1” present wide dispersion over a number of instances. This will result in the failure 
in mining a common path. To deal with “error features”, we design an error feature 
sensor which correct the timestamps of the error feature. The error feature sensor first 
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excludes the error feature from the MED before merging rows in MED. After merging 
rows, it adds the feature back to the first state of each path. For example, if a scheduled 
trip command to R1 is seen in the control panel log for the scenario that the path 
represents then CP = R1 is added to the first state of the path, otherwise, CP = 0 will be 
added. 
5.4.2.3 Grouping paths 
Grouping is an optional step which preprocesses input data to separate large 
classes into smaller sub-classes. Grouping can lead to more accurate classification when 
the sub-classes are sufficiently different from one another. 
Figure 5.6 clearly shows zone 1 and zone 2 trip boundaries for both relays. 
Additionally, Figure 5.6 shows that the relay trip times vary with fault location especially 
in the fault location region from 24-79% of the transmission line. System behavior also 
varies as the system load changes. 





















Ideally, instances of SLG fault at transmission line L1 scenarios (i.e. Q1) from a 
two zone distance protection scheme can be separated into 3 groups according to the area 
of the line in which the fault occurs. Group 1 includes faults from the length of the line 
which is protected by relay R1’s zone 1 and relay R2’s zone 2. From Figure 5.6, group 1 
includes faults which occur between 10-23% of the line. For group 1 faults, relay R1 
should trip instantly and R2 should trip after 0.4 seconds. Group 2 includes faults 
protected by relay R1’s and R2’s zone 1. Both relays should trip instantly for group 2 
faults. From Figure 5.6, group 2 faults occur between 24-79% of the line. Group 3 
includes faults protected by relay R1’s zone 2 and relay R2’s zone 1.  Relay R1 should 
trip after 20 cycles and R2 should trip instantly for group 3 faults. From Figure 5.6, group 
3 faults occur between 80-90% of the line.  
Observed trip times in group 2 tended to increase as the fault approached the zone 
1 to zone 2 boundary points.  To compensate for this observed behavior the SLG fault 
paths were grouped by fault location per the following groups; (10-23%, 24-29%, 30-
35%, 36-40%, 41-60%, 61-65%, 66-70%, 71-80%, 81-90%). Additionally, it was 
observed that trip times partially correlated to the system load. As a result, the SLG fault 
paths were grouped by fault location and load. Four load ranges were used; (200-249, 
250-399, 300-349, 350-399 MW).  This grouping subdivided the SLG fault paths into 
9*4 = 36 sub-groups. 
5.4.3 Mining common paths 
The mining paths step produced 5000 paths from 5000 instances of the 25 scenarios. The 
mining common path algorithm produced 477 common paths. The minimum and 
maximum number of common paths for a single scenario was 4 and 53 respectively. The 
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15 SLG fault scenarios had 421 common paths spread among them. The remaining 10 
scenarios had 56 common paths. The large number of common paths for the SGL faults is 
due to the large variation in relay trip times as fault location and system load varies. 
Common paths can be mapped into two-dimensional coordinates with the Y-axis 
indicating the state identification code (state ID) and the X-axis indicating normalized 
timestamps. An edge between two vertices represents the temporal transition between 
two states. Each vertex is marked with state information. Note that only necessary 
features are displayed to save space. Figure 5.7 shows common paths for two scenarios, a 
fault in the 36-40% fault location of line L1 and a fault replay attack on line L1.  The 
fault and fault replay paths both start at the system normal state. For real faults, the PMU 
will measure high current when a fault is present while for a fake fault the attacker injects 
high current measurement to the PMU. This makes the second state of the both common 
paths high current detected at relay R1, i.e. IR1 = High. However, these paths differ 
immediately because for the fault replay, the attacker has to inject relay trip commands to 
relay R1 and R2 at the same time. As such, the second state for the fault replay attack has 
the trip commands to R1 and R2 detected by Snort, i.e. SNT = (R1, R2) in Figure 5.7. 
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(IR1 = Normal, IR2 = Normal, R1 = 
NT, R2 = NT, SNT = 0, CP = 0)
(IR1 = High, IR2 = 
Normal, R1 = T, R2 = NT, 
SNT = 0, CP = 0)
(IR1 = High, IR2 = Normal, R1 
= NT, R2 = NT, SNT = (R1, 
R2), CP = 0)
(IR1 = High, IR2 = Normal, R1 = 
T, R2 = T, SNT = 0, CP = 0)
(IR1 = Normal, IR2 = Normal, 
R1 = T, R2 = T, SNT = 0, CP = 0)
(IR1 = Zero, IR2 = Zero, R1 = 
T, R2 = T, SNT = 0, CP = 0)
 
Figure 5.7 2-D coordinates documenting fault versus fault replay attack common paths 
 
Figure 5.8 shows common paths for line maintenance and command injection 
attack scenarios. The primary difference between the two scenarios is the command to 
open relays R1 and R2 originates from the control panel computer for the line 
maintenance scenario. This causes the control panel log to include a trip command 
message.  The common path for the line maintenance scenario includes a state noting the 
detection of control panel log events (i.e. CP = (R1, R2)) and states showing Snort 
detecting remote trip command network packets (i.e. SNT = (R1, R2)).  The common 






















(IR1 = Normal, IR2 = Normal, R1 = 
NT, R2 = NT, SNT = 0, CP = 0)
(IR1 = Normal, IR2 = Normal, 
R1 = NT, R2 = NT, SNT = 0, CP 
= (R1, R2))
(IR1 = Normal, IR2 = 
Normal, R1 = NT, R2 = NT, 
SNT = (R1, R2), CP = 0)
(IR1 = Normal, IR2 = 
Normal, R1 = T, R2 = T, 
SNT = 0, CP = 0)
(IR1 = Zero, IR2 = 
Zero, R1 = T, R2 = 
T, SNT = 0, CP = 0)
(IR1 = Zero, IR2 = 
Zero, R1 = T, R2 = 
T, SNT = 0, CP = 0)
(IR1 = Normal, IR2 = 
Normal, R1 = NT, R2 = NT, 
SNT = (R1, R2), CP = 0)
(IR1 = Normal, IR2 = 
Normal, R1 = T, R2 = T, 
SNT = 0, CP = 0)
 
Figure 5.8 2-D coordinates documenting ling maintenance versus command injection 
attack common paths 
 
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 demonstrate that common paths contain the critical 
states for different scenarios. The primary contribution of the mining common paths 
algorithm is the ability to automatically create unique paths for each scenario type from 
data sets which measure behavior associated with the scenarios. 
5.4.4 Evaluation 
Three approaches were used to evaluate the IDS. First, the IDS was used to 
classify 5,000 instances of scenarios from the test data set described in section IV of this 
chapter.  Confusion matrices are provided to show IDS accuracy. A detailed review of the 
algorithms ability to classify SLG faults by fault location is also provided. Second, 
training and testing was repeated with sets of 4 scenarios missing from the data set. This 
test was used to demonstrate the IDS’s ability to detect zero day attacks and unknown 
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scenarios. Finally, IDS cost and performance was measured by measuring the amount of 
processing time and memory required during training and evaluation. 
Table 5.2 Confusion matrix for scenarios Q1-Q13 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 
Q1 505 0 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q2 0 502 0 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q3 10 0 301 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q4 0 6 0 321 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 31 0 
Q5 0 0 0 0 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q6 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q7 0 0 0 0 0 0 67 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 0 0 
Q9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 99 0 0 0 0 
Q10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 
Q11 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 127 0 0 
Q12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 104 0 
Q13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 179 
Oth. 1 2 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unk 3 1 4 0 0 1 35 32 0 26 0 0 0 
Unc 0 2 8 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5.3 Confusion matrix for scenarios Q14-Q25 
 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q21 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 
Q14 220 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q15 0 208 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q16 0 0 162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q17 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q18 0 0 0 0 73 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q19 0 0 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Q20 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 
Q21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 424 0 0 0 0 
Q22 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 413 0 0 0 
Q23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 122 0 0 
Q24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 0 
Q25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 114 
Oth 0 0 0 2 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unk 10 12 2 23 0 12 0 6 33 16 19 0 




Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 provide confusion matrices for the 25 tested scenarios.  
The confusion matrices were separated into two tables to allow them to fit in the column 
width of this chapter. The row labeled “Oth” represents scenarios Q14-Q25 in Table 1 
and Q1-Q13 in Table 5.2. The row labeled “Unk” provides the number of instances 
which were unclassified due to no matching common path.  Finally, the row labeled 
“Unc” provides the number of instances with uncertain classification due to matching 
more than one common path from more than one scenario.  
In total, 90.4% of the tested instances were correctly classified and 2.7% of the 
instances were misclassified.  4.7% of instances were classified as unknown and 2.2% 
were classified as uncertain. All of the cases of uncertain classification were related to 
SLG fault instances which matched common path for more than one fault scenario.  
Table 5.4 Confusion matrix for sub-groups in scenario Q1 

















10-23% 191 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
23-29% 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30-35% 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
36-40% 0 7 0 2 6 0 0 0 0 
41-60% 0 0 0 2 41 2 0 0 0 
61-65% 0 0 0 0 5 10 0 0 0 
65-70% 0 0 0 0 8 3 14 4 0 
71-80% 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 38 18 
81-90% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 135 
Unk. Fault 0 0 9 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Unk 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 5.4 displays a confusion matrix of classifications of the sub-groups for 
scenario Q1 which is a SLG fault on line L1. As previously mentioned, the SLG fault 
paths were grouped by fault location and system load. To save space the groups in the 
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confusion matrix were combined to just show the fault location grouping. The row 
labeled “Unk. Fault” indicates unknown faults, i.e. instances classified as more than one 
fault. The row labeled “Unk” indicates unknown classification, i.e. instances which could 
not be classified due to not matching a common path. 
The overall accuracy rate for the groups shown in the Table 5.4 was 84.6%. The 
majority of misclassification occurred when SLG fault groups were classified as 
members of a neighboring or nearby fault group.  The 16 cases of unknown faults all 
occurred because both the (30-35%) and (36-40%) shared a common path.  The intent of 
the grouping of SLG faults was not to classify SLG faults by a specific fault location. 
However, Table 5.4 demonstrates the mining common path algorithm’s strength of 
finding unique paths for even similar scenarios. 
Training and classification processing time and memory usage were measured 
using an Ubuntu Linux Virtual Machine with 3.5GHZ CPU and 2GB memory. Training 
required 0.33 seconds per scenario instance and 34 MB memory. Classification of test 
cases required 0.85 seconds per scenario instance to complete and 26.2 MB of memory. 
Tenfold cross-validation was used to evaluate the detection accuracy of zero-day 
attack scenarios as shown in Table 5.4. For each round of testing four scenarios are 
randomly selected to be excluded from training but present in the testing data set. The 
average detection accuracy for zero-day attack scenarios was 73.43%. However, there are 
cases where the detection rate for zero day attack is low. For example, in Round 3, the 
zero day detection rate was 50.5%. Analysis of this case showed that scenario Q6 
(command injection to trip relay R1 and R2) was always misclassified as scenario Q3 
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(fault replay attack on Line L1). This is reasonable because the fault replay attack 
includes injected trip commands targeting relays R1 and R2. 
Table 5.5 Detection accuracy for 4 random zero-day attacks 10x validation 
Round Excluded Scenarios Z.D. Acc. (%) 
1 Q3, Q11, Q18, Q22 76.3 
2 Q2, Q8, Q12, Q23 67.3 
3 Q6, Q11, Q16, Q17 50.5 
4 Q1, Q5, Q8, Q10 73.3 
5 Q1, Q9, Q19, Q21 91.8 
6 Q5, Q13, Q20, Q23 64.7 
7 Q5, Q10, Q15, Q16 63.8 
8 Q12, Q13, Q19, Q24 70.7 
9 Q2, Q7, Q9, Q17 76.3 
10 Q9, Q10, Q16, Q19 99.8 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The IDS described in this chapter provides stateful monitoring of an electric 
transmission distance protection system by leveraging a fusion of synchrophasor data and 
information from relay, network security logs, and energy management system logs. 
The IDS is trained using a mining common paths algorithm. Common paths are 
hybrid signatures and specifications which described patterns of system behavior 
associated with power system events. The algorithm provides a time-domain data 
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analysis approach to overcome transients present in the measurements. This is done by 
mining shared states out of a group of observed paths. Common paths are used to 
describe system responses to power system disturbances, control actions, and cyber-
attacks. 
The IDS matches monitored system state traversal to common paths to make 
classification decisions. Classification is specific to each trained scenario rather than 
simply an indication of normal or abnormal activity. 
In this work the IDS was trained an evaluated for a 3-bus 2-line transmission 
system which implements a 2 zone distance protection scheme.  Twenty five scenarios 
consisting of SLG faults, control actions, and cyber-attacks were implemented on a 
hardware-in-the-loop test bed. Scenarios were run in a loop 10,000 times with 
randomized system parameters to create a dataset for IDS training and evaluation.  The 
IDS correctly classified 90.4% of tested scenario instances.  Evaluation also included a 
tenfold cross-validation to evaluate the detection accuracy of zero-day attack scenarios. 
The average detection accuracy for zero-day attack scenarios was 73.43%. The 
performance of the proposed IDS has outscored that in [43] in average detection accuracy 




CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
6.1 Conclusion 
Synchrophasor systems are an emerging technology.  Prior to installation of a 
synchrophasor system a set of cyber security requirements must be developed, new 
devices must undergo vulnerability testing, and proper security controls must be designed 
to protect the synchrophasor system from unauthorized access.   
In this dissertation we described the process used to develop a set of cyber 
security requirements in the design stage of a synchrophasor project.  A set of cyber 
security rules was derived from review of the NISTIR 7628 Guidelines for Smart Grid 
Cyber Security, DHS Security Procurement Language for Control Systems, and from 
utility internal requirements. Next, the dissertation discussed a cybersecurity vulnerability 
analysis and testing process. The testing process included network congestion and 
protocol mutation testing of multiple phasor measurement units and phasor data 
concentrators. The testing section provides limited results due to confidentiality 
agreements and ethical reporting requirements. The testing section also discussed short 
comings of the fuzzing tool used and described a network fuzzing framework that is 
capable of fuzzing server to client interactions, client to server packet contents, and 
system state.  Next, the dissertation discussed the process of reviewing synchrophasor 
system components against the drafted cyber security requirements.  Each requirement 
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was discussed in the context of the synchrophasor system and recommendations were 
provided for meeting requirements.  This dissertation also provides discussion on writing 
SNORT intrusion detection rules based upon the results of cyber security testing. 
While fixing the identified vulnerabilities in information infrastructure is 
imperative to a secure power system, it is likely that successful intrusions will still occur. 
The ability to detect intrusions is necessary to mitigate the negative effects from 
successful attacks. This dissertation proposed a data mining algorithm called the mining 
common path algorithm to learn patterns from data for different power system scenarios. 
The mining common paths algorithm creates common paths which represent a set of 
critical states that a system will step through in temporal order for a power system 
scenario. The algorithm provides a time-domain data analysis approach to overcome 
transients present in the measurements. This is done by mining shared states out of a 
group of observed paths. The resulting classifier matches monitored system state traversal 
to common paths to make classfication decisions. In effect, the mining common path 
algorithm creates a set of temporal signatures for a system which describe scenarios.  
This approach presented is applicable to many types of industrial control systems where 
control algoorithms are well known and cyber attack impacts can be examined on a 
system test bed. 
Multiple case studies were performed to validate the mining common paths 
algorithm and the IDS which used common paths created by the mining common paths 
algorithm.  
First, to demonstrate the ability of the mining common paths algorithm to learn 
common paths from complex power system data, a case study was performed to 
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demonstrate the ability to learn common paths for and distinguish SLG ground faults and 
command injection attacks which remotely trip relays on a 3-bus 2-line transmission 
system.  The experiment applied the mining common paths algorithm to data with 2 
classes; faults and command injection. This experiment demonstrated the ability of the 
mining common paths algorithm to find common paths for both types of scenarios, power 
system events and cyber-attacks. Furthermore, the experiment demonstrated the 
precicions of the mining common paths algorithm by showing that faults grouped by 
location and system load could be accurately distringuished from one another using 
common paths created by the algorithm. 
Second, an IDS prototype was built that employs common paths to detect power 
system disturbances, control actions, and cyber-attacks on a larger scale. The IDS used 
stateful monitoring of the electric transmission distance protection system by leveraging a 
fusion of synchrophasor data and information from relay, network security logs, and 
energy management system logs. The IDS matches monitored system state traversal to 
common paths to make classification decisions. Classification was specific to each 
trained scenario rather than simply an indication of normal or abnormal activity. 
The IDS was trained an evaluated for a 3-bus 2-line transmission system which 
implemented a 2 zone distance protection scheme.  Twenty five scenarios consisting of 
SLG faults, control actions, and cyber-attacks were implemented on a hardware-in-the-
loop test bed. Scenarios were run in a loop 10,000 times with randomized system 
parameters to create a dataset for IDS training and evaluation.  The IDS correctly 
classified 90.4% of tested scenario instances.  Evaluation also included a tenfold cross-
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validation to evaluate the detection accuracy of zero-day attack scenarios. The average 
detection accuracy for zero-day attack scenarios was 73.43%. 
Table 6.1 summarizes how the intrusion detection system proposed in this 
dissertation fulfills the seven requirements introduced in Chapter I. 
Table 6.1 Fulfillment of seven requirements for the proposed IDS 
Req. # Req. Description How the proposed IDS meets requirements 
1 
The IDS should provide 
stateful monitoring. 
This requirement is met by monitoring the 
system according to a state machine in 2-D 
graph. The state machine contains a number of 
common paths which represent the patterns of 
power system scenarios and cyber-attacks. 
Common paths are mined from data collected 
across the system. 
2 
The IDS should be able to 
detect power system 
disturbances, normal 
control operations and 
cyber-attacks 
25 scenarios were created for power system 
disturbances, normal control operations and 
cyber-attacks. The IDS creates a set of unique 
common paths for each scenario and makes 










Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Req. # Req. Description How the proposed IDS meets requirements 
3 
The IDS should be able to 
detect zero day attacks 
Test cases that have patterns that do not match 
any of the common paths trained in the IDS 
are classified as zero day attacks. The 
experiment in Section 5.5 showed that the 
average detection rate for four unknown 
scenarios is 73.43%. This is higher than what 
was reported in [43]. 
4 
The IDS should be able to 
process large amount of 
data 
This is done by a data formatting process 
where a large amount of synchrophasor data 
and logs are aggregated and processed into a 
special form called path. A path is a compact 
representation of large volume of data as it 
only consists of a sequence of system states. 
The mining common paths algorithm is further 
used to shrink the larger group of paths into a 
representative set of common paths which 
represent normal variation and serve as a set of 




Table 6.1 (Continued)  
Req. # Req. Description How the proposed IDS meets requirements 
5 
The Development of IDS 
should have low cost. 
The IDS construction process from data 
formatting to generating common paths can be 
automated by software. Although expert 
knowledge is still needed for feature 
quantization and may be used for path 
grouping, this is huge progress with 
comparison to [27] where rules are created 
manually using expertise.  
6 
The IDS should be able to 
withstand continuous 
changes to system 
configuration and load 
level changes. 
Results show the IDS can detect changes in 
configuration which result from operators 
taking a line out of service or a relay operating 
after detecting a fault by learning these 
patterns from collected data. New changes in 
configuration will result in new scenarios. 
Since the IDS learns patterns from data, new 
scenarios will be simulated in the test bed and 
relevant data will be collected to train the IDS. 
The IDS overcomes changes in load level by 
grouping paths according to load level ranges 




Table 6.1 (Continued)  
Req. # Req. Description How the proposed IDS meets requirements 
7 
The IDS should have high 
detection accuracy and a 
low false positive rate. 
The evaluation results in Section 5.5 has 
shown that for classifying 25 scenarios 90.4% 
of the tested instances were correctly classified 
and 2.7% of the instances were misclassified. 
4.7% of instances were classified as unknown 
and 2.2% were classified as uncertain.  
 
6.2 Future Works 
This dissertation enables  multiple possible future. First, the vulnerability 
assessment process presented in this work can be applied to other emerging cyber-
physical systems such as advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and other industrial 
control systems.  As to different cyber-physical systems, different sets of penetration tests 
can be developed based on the unique structure of the target system and the control and 
protection algorithms available in the system in order to study the attack consequences on 
corresponding systems. The fuzzing framework proposed in this work can also be 
extended to test other industrial protocols such as MODBUS and ANS C12.22 for AMI. 
While penetration testing is a practical method to assess a target system’s security 
features, the other method of performing vulnerability assessment is through theoretical 
methodologies such as Bayesian network and attack tree formulation. The theoretical 
method can be applied to cyber-physical systems to derive quantitative vulnerability 
measures in order to determine how likely a vulnerability can be exploited. 
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Second, we have shown that the proposed IDS works for a 3-bus and 2-line 
transmission system implemented distance protection scheme. However, a realistic power 
system usually contains thousands of buses and transmission lines. Training the IDS for 
such a large system will raise other questions, for example, is data from all transmission 
line required for training? Are all features needed? While PMU are not available for each 
transmission line, what will be the optimal locations to place PMU in order to collect the 
data needed for training the IDS? 
Third, an immediate next step for the IDS will be to implement the IDS in real-
time. This requires the IDS to be able to process a continuous stream of synchrophasor 
data. In this dissertation, for proof of concept the proposed IDS is trained and tested with 
off-line data. To achieve real-time implementation, two methods can be used. In the first 
method, the synchrophasor data stream can be first buffered in a historian. Then the 
common paths of different scenarios can be learned from historian data off-line using 
mining common paths algorithm but the detection can be implemented in real time to 
match the system states to the common paths. The second method is to implement the 
learning process in real-time as well. In this case, the continuous data stream may be 
windowed to learn paths. The mining common path algorithm might need to be updated 
so that the known patterns can be refined based on the new path learned from the coming 
data in a window. The potential problems associated with this method are related to the 
definition of the size for a window and the start of the window. The start of the window 
determines the start state of a path. In this dissertation, a path starts from the system 
normal state. But in a more complex environment where the occurrence of scenarios 
might overlap, the start of a window may not be easily found. Also, other data mining 
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methods such as stream data mining may be worth investigating to learn patterns from a 
continuous data stream for the purpose of intrusion detection.  
Forth, the future plan for intrusion detection will include using pattern recognition 
techniques to detect anomalies [76][77][78][79]. In addition, the causal event graph 
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